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RISK MANAGEMENT, RESPONSIVE REGULATION, 
AND OVERSIGHT OF STRUCTURED FINANCIAL 
PRODUCT MARKETS 
JANIS SARRA† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Globally, regulators, supervisory authorities, and governments are grappling 
with what have now been identified as systemic risk factors that contributed 
to the recent global financial crisis. Internationally, the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision and other organizations are developing standards to 
identify and address systemic risk, suggesting that the extent of regulation or 
exemption from it can serve as a mechanism by which risk is transferred 
within the financial system. The Cross-border Bank Resolution Group of the 
Basel Committee has developed ten recommendations as a result of its stock-
taking of lessons learned from the financial crisis.1 The Financial Stability 
Board (FSB), an organization of national financial authorities and interna-
tional standard-setting bodies, has developed a policy framework for reduc-
ing the moral hazard of systemically important financial institutions and for 
reforming derivatives markets.2 These initiatives are mirrored by similar ini-
tiatives in international organizations, national and regional governments, 
and a myriad of other regulatory and non-regulatory agencies. 
                                                                    
†  Professor, University of British Columbia Faculty of Law.  
1  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Report and Recommendations of the Cross-
Border Bank Resolution Group (March 2010), online: Bank for International Settlements 
<http://www.bis.org> [Basel Committee, Cross-Border] at 22–43. 
2  FSB, Reducing the Moral Hazard Posed by Systemically Important Financial Institutions 
(20 October 2010), online: <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org>.  
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The recommendations being developed by government-sponsored inter-
national organizations point to three critically important aspects of today’s 
financial markets. First, they are highly globalized, which means that regula-
tion solely by individual states is no longer a sufficient response to the condi-
tions that created the crisis. Financial market players span hundreds of bor-
ders, and organize their structures globally for a variety of efficiency, tax-
related, liability-related, and other reasons. The interconnectedness of both 
financial structures and financial products creates tremendous challenges for 
considering the scope and limits of regulatory oversight. Second, at best, the 
suggestions generated by these international organizations need to be broad 
brush strokes, as they operate in a global system in which the type and inten-
sity of regulatory oversight varies considerably. While a need for global stan-
dards has been identified, the likelihood of global convergence towards one 
set of specific standards is slim. Third, there are very diverse regulatory spaces 
for oversight of financial markets, including state regulators, self-regulatory 
organizations, and coalitions of business or financial interests that actively 
pursue their objectives in an array of regulatory spheres. The complexity of 
the issues, and the regulatory structures that respond to them, pose signifi-
cant challenges. It is evident that many of the initiatives to date have not ad-
dressed the need for a broad-based, participatory public policy debate on the 
normative objectives that new regulatory requirements seek to achieve. 
The issues raised by this significant upheaval in the financial system will 
be the subject of analysis for years to come. On the occasion of John 
Braithwaite’s Fasken Visiting Scholar Lecture and workshop on responsive 
regulation at the University of British Columbia in 2010, this paper explores 
a very specific issue among the many raised in respect of regulatory oversight 
of systemic risk in financial markets. Specifically, it analyses Braithwaite’s 
pyramidal approach to regulatory processes, to assess whether it offers help-
ful suggestions for the current effort to determine new regulatory standards 
for the structured financial products market. Derivatives, collateralized debt 
obligations, and similar products have been viewed as major contributors to 
the financial meltdown that commenced in 2008. The paper suggests that 
Braithwaite’s model of responsive regulation may have some application, par-
ticularly in engaging local citizens in a collaborative policy discussion regard-
ing regulatory oversight. Essentially, Braithwaite advocates a highly dialogic 
and responsive process in which market participants engage with regulators 
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to structure solutions to market problems and create a support structure 
promoting continuous improvement. He suggests that regulators should not 
rush to law enforcement solutions before engaging with stakeholders to de-
velop a range of policy responses. However, the effectiveness of Braithwaite’s 
approach is limited by the global nature of these challenges, the intractable 
nature of private organizations on the global stage in their efforts to resist 
regulatory change, and profound power imbalances and information asym-
metries that would need to be addressed to make such processes more ac-
countable. 
Part II of the paper sets out the challenge for oversight of structured fi-
nancial products markets, including the market conditions in respect of such 
products that contributed to the global financial crisis and the lacuna in 
regulatory oversight. Part III analyzes the contribution of responsive regula-
tion theory to issues raised by current market conditions. Part IV then sug-
gests that regulatory strategies must address the problems arising out of the 
crisis, including the moral hazards and the governance issues. Part V assesses 
the potential contribution of responsive regulation. One issue is that respon-
sive regulation takes time, and there are specific normative principles that 
could be immediately implemented, as placeholders, to temper the most seri-
ous negative distributive harms to market participants. Such principles would 
guide regulatory responses in the financial services sector and help avoid 
regulatory capture, if the discourse about regulatory oversight that is an es-
sential aspect of responsive regulation is truly to be meaningful. While the 
potential exists for more responsive regulation, it is vulnerable to hearing 
only from the regulated, given the classic problem of organized versus unor-
ganized constituencies and the constraints on their capacity to acquire 
knowledge, disseminate their views, and influence regulatory change.  
II. THE CHALLENGE  
Financial services assist the functioning of market economies: they can help 
manage risk, they intermediate credit transactions, and they transform the 
maturities of assets and liabilities to create liquidity in the market. However, 
liquidity and solvency issues in financial services can severely impact national 
and regional economies. Although there is some international consensus on 
several factors that contributed to the financial crisis, such as inadequate 
capital adequacy requirements, opaque disclosure requirements in respect of 
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structured financial products, and failure to appreciate systemic risk, there is 
considerable normative disagreement regarding the need for regulatory in-
tervention as a forward-looking remedy—in particular, regarding the scope 
of regulatory oversight that may be needed for structured financial products.3 
These products include both derivatives and securitization. 
A. DERIVATIVES 
Derivatives have an important role in managing the risk of direct investment, 
but their original objective of risk diversification has been overtaken by a vast 
speculative market. The rapid introduction of new, complex products created 
systemic risks to financial markets, and, in turn, to real economies—without 
the monitoring and discipline that occurs for securities markets or traditional 
commercial lending activity. The lack of transparency of these products 
meant that counterparty risk was not well understood or appropriately 
priced. As Andrew Haldane, Executive Director of Financial Stability for the 
Bank of England, infamously stated, “an investor in a [CDO squared, a par-
ticularly complex type of collateralized debt obligation] would need to read 
in excess of 1 billion pages to understand fully the ingredients.”4 The com-
modification of risk and creation of complex interlocking products resulted 
                                                                    
3  See e.g. US, The President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, Policy Statement on 
Financial Market Developments (March 2008), online: Department of the Treasury 
<http://www.treasury.gov>; Financial Stability Forum, Report of the Financial Stability 
Forum on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience (7 April 2008), online: 
<http://www.financialstabilityboard.org>; International Monetary Fund, The Recent Fi-
nancial Turmoil—Initial Assessment, Policy Lessons, and Implications for Fund Surveillance 
(9 April 2008), online: <http://www.imf.org>; Counterparty Risk Management Policy 
Group III, Containing Systemic Risk: The Road to Reform (6 August 2008), online: 
<http://www.crmpolicygroup.org>; G-20 Study Group, Report on Global Credit Market 
Disruptions (19 November 2008), online: <http://www.g20.org>; Senior Supervisors 
Group, Observations on Risk Management Practices during the Recent Market Turbulence 
(6 March 2008), online: Federal Reserve Bank of New York <http://www 
.newyorkfed.org>. 
4  Andrew G Haldane, “Rethinking the Financial Network” (Speech delivered at the Finan-
cial Student Association, Amsterdam, April 2009), online: Bank of England 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk> at 17. 
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in a financial system increasingly interconnected, operating on a global scale, 
but concentrated in a few key financial hubs such as London and New York, 
with little sense of the risks to the overall system.  
The shocks in 2008–2009 were a number of years in the making. Glob-
ally, credit derivatives exposures by ratings had been shifting downward, with 
many moving from AAA to below investment grade in the previous five 
years.5 Banks’ market share of derivatives declined as hedge funds increas-
ingly took a greater share of both the buy side and sell side of the market.6 As 
margins squeezed at the upper end of the credit curve, hedge funds shifted to 
more speculative investment grades and unrated exposures to maintain re-
turns. The nature of traditional banking also shifted with these changes in 
the market. Banks increased their leverage, increased their use of securitiza-
tion, and increased the writing of “deep out-of-the-money options”, each in-
creasing risk in the system that was not recognized at the time.7 Together, 
these changes altered the credit derivatives market significantly, without any 
jurisdiction seriously assessing the public policy implications.8  
The very notion of credit derivatives was the design of a financial product 
that allowed banks and other financial institutions to manage risk.9 There are 
                                                                    
5  See Elizabeth Murphy, Janis Sarra & Michael Creber, “Credit Derivatives in Canadian 
Insolvency Proceedings, ‘The Devil will be in the Details’” in Janis P Sarra, ed, Annual 
Review of Insolvency Law, 2006 (Toronto: Carswell, 2007) 187.  
6  Ross Barrett & John Ewan, BBA Credit Derivatives Report, 2006 (London: British Bank-
ers Association, 2006) at 6. In 2000, banks accounted 81% of the buy side and 63% of the 
sell side of market share, that number dropping to 59% and 44% respectively by 2006. 
Hedge funds went from 3% of the market on the buy side in 2000 to 28% market share in 
2006. As a seller, their market share grew from 5% to 32% in the same period. 
7  Mark Carney, “The Economic Consequences of the Reforms” (Bundesbank Lecture 
2010, delivered to Deutsche Bundesbank, 14 September 2010), online: Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements <http://www.bis.org>, noting that by “borrowing in short-term 
wholesale markets to fund asset growth, banks became more dependent on continuous 
access to liquidity” in both the money markets and capital markets. 
8  See Janis Sarra, “Credit Derivatives Market Design, Creating Fairness and Sustainability” 
(Network for Sustainable Financial Markets, December 2008), online: Social Science Re-
search Network <http://ssrn.com>. 
9  See Murphy, Sarra & Creber, supra note 5.  
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numerous kinds of credit derivatives, such as credit default swaps,10 collateral-
ized debt obligations (CDOs), full and index trades, and credit-linked notes. 
Credit derivatives are classified as either single-name credit derivatives, tar-
geted on the credit worthiness of a single reference entity, or multi-name 
(basket) products that hedge the risk of clustered defaults in a portfolio.11 A 
credit derivative can be a privately negotiated agreement that explicitly shifts 
credit risk from one party to the other, or it can be collateralized and housed 
within a special-purpose vehicle that resells debt contracts in various tranches 
at differing prices, quality, and risk.12 CDO can be cash flow based, whereby 
the vehicle issues its own financial instruments to finance purchase of debts 
of different corporate entities, ensuring a fixed flow of loan repayments that 
are used to pay investors in the various tranches. Alternatively, a CDO can be 
synthetic, whereby the entity does not directly purchase debts but rather en-
ters into credit default swaps with a third party, creating synthetic exposure 
to the debt of a number of corporate entities.13 The diverse nature of these 
products made it difficult for both regulators and market participants to un-
derstand the myriad of products and their complex terms and conditions. 
As a risk management tool, credit derivatives were designed as a means of 
diversifying lending risk by covering exposures where there have been credit 
events of the underlying reference entities.14 However, as products prolifer-
ated in number and complexity, they increased the risk of losses for less-
sophisticated investors, creating negative incentives for particular counter-
                                                                    
10  Sarra, supra note 8 at 2. The most common credit derivative, a credit default swap (CDS), 
is a credit derivative contract in which one party, the “protection buyer”, pays a sum of 
money periodically to the “protection seller”, usually referable to the amount of protec-
tion provided by the contract. The protection seller’s obligation to pay arises on the oc-
currence of a credit event. The reference entity is not a party to the credit default swap. 
The protection buyer that is a creditor of the reference entity hedges the risk of default by 
that entity, and takes on the risk of default by the protection seller. The protection seller 
acquires the default risk of the reference entity.  
11  Murphy, Sarra & Creber, supra note 5. 
12  Sarra, supra note 8 at 4. 
13  US, Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (Washington, 
DC: US Government Printing Office, January 2011) at 142–44. 
14  Sarra, supra note 8. 
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parties to these transactions. The original objective of banks managing the 
risk of direct investment under lending portfolios was overtaken by a specu-
lative market for buying and selling derivatives in multiples of the value of the 
underlying reference assets or entities, resulting in a significant trading mar-
ket involving a greater number of market participants.15 The risks arose in 
part because of the expansion to markets involving asset-backed commercial 
paper, residential mortgages, and other products where some of the underly-
ing assets had been inappropriately valued or rated and thus risk mispriced. 
These risks also arose when derivatives became part of the “originate and dis-
tribute” model of lending. 
When traditional incentives to assess the quality of loans were weakened, 
the contagion risk associated with structured financial products was very 
high. In the search for short-term returns, products became associated with 
poor quality US subprime mortgages, and belated realization of the degen-
eration of quality by credit rating agencies resulted in ratings downgrades. 
Investors began to shun the products and the contagion effect led to a failure 
of confidence; for example, the sub-prime crisis spread to the asset-backed 
commercial paper market. The rapid spread to other products resulted in 
risks to the financial health of counterparties to all these transactions, and in 
particular, to banks in many jurisdictions, eventually creating a more general 
credit crisis.  
The mechanism by which the contagion spread was as follows. Down-
grading ratings meant that the value of the derivative dropped, resulting in a 
concomitant drop in the value of the assets on the financial institution’s 
books. In turn, the financial institution was required to raise additional capi-
tal. However, raising capital by selling assets was more difficult because no 
one was certain about the current price for the assets, since the downgrades 
called into question previous valuations. If the financial institution tried to 
raise capital through borrowing, uncertain valuation of the assets it was offer-
ing as security for the loan made obtaining a reasonable rate of interest more 
and more difficult. Finally, in some markets, such as the market for asset-
backed commercial notes, all trading ceased due to the inability of market 
participants to put any value on the underlying assets. To the extent that fi-
                                                                    
15  Ibid. 
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nancial institutions had sold credit protection, they faced calls to put up ad-
ditional collateral to support the credit protection contracts because of grow-
ing doubts about the valuation of collateral previously pledged as security, or 
doubts about the ability of financial institutions to honour the contract. 
The lack of understanding of the systemic risk associated with structured 
financial products may speak to a deeper set of problems associated with 
regulatory oversight. The framework of regulatory policy-making means that 
regulators are dependent on market participants to identify hazards and craft 
policy responses. Yet the narrow scope of participants in these initiatives 
meant that the understanding of products and their risk was informed by 
those market players that had the most to gain from exemptions to regula-
tory oversight, from the opacity of the products, and assurances that the risks 
were only to sophisticated counterparties. Although one identified problem 
has been the issue of attracting and retaining skilled financial services regula-
tors as a counterbalance to the pressures by market participants for exemp-
tions from oversight, there may be a more deeply embedded cognitive set of 
issues, in that the narrow community of interests engaged in the regulatory 
discussion fostered an inability to perceive and respond to the systemic risks. 
B. THE ASSET-BACKED COMMERCIAL PAPER MARKET 
The asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) market in Canada principally 
involved short-term commercial paper, with terms usually ranging from 30 to 
90 days, typically with a low-interest yield that was slightly better than that 
available through other short-term paper from a government or bank; the 
balance was made up of commercial paper that was extendible for up to 364 
days and longer-term floating rate notes.16 The capital that was used to pur-
chase an ABCP note was converted into a portfolio of financial assets or 
other asset interests, to be held, directly or through subsidiary trusts, by the 
trustees of conduits.17 The types of assets and asset interests acquired to sup-
port ABCP notes in Canada were generally medium- to long-term assets 
                                                                    
16  Janis Sarra, “Restructuring of the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Market in Canada” 
[Sarra, “Restructuring”] in Janis P Sarra, ed, Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2008 (To-
ronto: Carswell, 2009) 315 at 315–54. 
17  Ibid at 316–17. 
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such as residential mortgages, credit card receivables, auto loans, cash collat-
eralized debt obligations, and derivative investments such as credit default 
swaps. The market was dependent on the liquidity of the ABCP. Due to the 
nature of the assets backing the ABCP, the cash flow they generated did not 
match the cash flow required to repay maturing ABCP. Prior to mid-August 
2007, this timing mismatch was not problematic because many investors 
chose to roll or reinvest their existing ABCP at maturity, not requiring re-
payment.18 Moreover, new ABCP was being sold continually, which gener-
ated funds to repay maturing ABCP where investors required payment. As 
long as investors were rolling their ABCP or buying new ABCP to replace 
maturing notes, the ABCP market was stable.  
There was a lack of transparency in the ABCP market in respect of the 
mix of assets that backed the ABCP. The ABCP had often been issued and 
sold before the assets were acquired, and then frequently resold, so that pur-
chasers were unaware of precisely the nature of, and risk associated with, the 
assets backing their investment.19 A number of the assets were complex struc-
tured financial products, and confidentiality requirements in respect of the 
terms of some underlying contracts created a real opacity in the products. 
When the US sub-prime crisis was in full swing, although only five per cent 
of the Canadian ABCP market was invested in sub-prime mortgages, there 
was a contagion effect in the market. As the defaults on US sub-prime mort-
gages rapidly rose, investors in Canadian ABCP lost confidence in the mar-
ket, worrying that sub-prime mortgages or other over-valued assets were 
backing their paper.20 The lack of transparency regarding the pool of assets 
backing the ABCP exacerbated the lack of confidence. As ABCP became 
due, investors stopped purchasing ABCP and existing noteholders ceased 
rolling over their maturing notes. By August 2007, seven trusts could not 
repay their noteholders the amounts due on $32 billion of ABCP, and the 
market was at risk of complete collapse.21 Although most of the value of the 
                                                                    
18  Ibid at 319. 
19  Ibid at 318. 
20  Ibid. 
21  Ibid at 319. At a meeting of major market participants, a number of asset providers, li-
quidity providers, noteholders, and other financial industry representatives, agreed to a 
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third-party ABCP was held by approximately one hundred institutional in-
vestors and corporations, it became evident during the restructuring proceed-
ings that there were more than two thousand retail investors holding ABCP, 
many of whom were retirees who had been led to believe that the ABCP was 
a stable and relatively low-risk investment.22 
C. SECURITIZATION 
Banks had shifted their traditional lending practices to employ securitization 
in most asset-backed lending. Securitization was ostensibly aimed at reducing 
credit risk by diversifying funding and freeing up funds to lend back into the 
market. However, in many instances, banks did not transfer risks fully and 
were left holding large quantities of leveraged super-senior tranches of struc-
tured products.23 Banks and other financial institutions became heavily reli-
ant on the liquidity of markets that had few rules and little regulatory over-
sight. Regulators erroneously assumed that the securitization process led to 
greater risk-spreading between institutions and across borders.24 
A negative feature of securitization is that economic risk is held by 
tranches of debt. Once fees are extracted by the originator of the loan, much 
of the risk is passed along. Further opacity is created by the syndication of 
debt, in which more than 200 banks, hedge funds, and other lenders may 
hold a portion of the debt in a syndicated loan, with that debt hedged 
through further securitization or purchase of credit default swaps.  
The rating instruments in respect of securitized tranches were also out-
dated; and investors relied too much on credit ratings and failed to take ac-
                                                                                                                                               
standstill agreement in which major market participants agreed to freeze $32 billion in 
third-party ABCP on 13 August 2007, pending a strategy to address the liquidity crisis. 
22  Ibid at 322. Ernst & Young, hired as advisors to the Pan-Canadian Investor Committee 
for Third-Party Structured Asset-Backed Commercial Paper, undertook a media cam-
paign to locate ABCP investors, asking them to confirm their holdings; created a public 
website and telephone information line for investors seeking information; set up physical 
and virtual data rooms to provide information concerning the legal and financial struc-
tures of the conduits and each series of ABCP. 
23  Carney, supra note 7 at 3. 
24  Julia Black & Robert Baldwin, “Really Responsive Risk-Based Regulation” (2010) 32:2 
Law & Pol’y 181 at 206. 
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count of the liquidity risk and lack of transparency regarding the invest-
ments. For example, banks would sell tranches of sub-prime mortgages, bun-
dled across hundreds of thousands of sub-prime mortgages, in up to twelve 
tranches with the riskiest still being rated above investment grade. The high-
est ratings reflected the credit rating agencies’ assessment that any calls would 
never reach the higher tranches, rather than any assessment of the actual 
quality of the debt. Investors were willing to invest because they held a large 
coupon and thought that the chance of nation-wide failure of the mortgage 
markets was slim.  
D. CAPITAL ADEQUACY 
Capital adequacy requirements are also linked to the challenges posed for 
regulatory oversight of structured financial products. Banks are highly inter-
connected, through the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market, foreign 
exchange market, and inter-bank transactions, creating substantial counter-
party risk that only became apparent with the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
and other financial institutions. The risk profile of banks can alter quickly 
from market developments even without affirmative action on the part of the 
bank. A bank’s holdings of financial assets include both debt and equity se-
curities, as well as hybrid products; the securitization of debt allows a bank to 
liquidate its long-term debt arrangements, such as commercial and residential 
mortgages, and shift the value to new assets with a much higher risk profile. 
These structures directly impacted the need for banks to maintain adequate 
capital standards. There was a lack of understanding of the relationship be-
tween structured financial products, capital adequacy, and the larger econ-
omy.  
A number of products in the market shifted away from banks with their 
prudential obligations, to other institutions and market players. A number of 
the traditional functions of banks shifted to hedge funds, mortgage interme-
diaries and brokers, structured investment vehicles, and market intermediar-
ies, collectively referred to as the “shadow banking system”. The shadow 
banking system was not subject to the same capital adequacy requirements as 
traditional commercial banks, yet their market share of financial services 
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products was as significant as that held by the banks at the time of the global 
financial crisis.25 
The Basel Committee has now recognized that the capital adequacy re-
quirements for commercial banks were insufficient, because Basel II left too 
much decision making in the hands of the financial institutions, on the 
premise that financial institutions would make decisions that ensured the 
safety and soundness of the system overall. Basel II also encouraged procycli-
cal tendencies that permitted excessive leveraging and failed to account for 
both specific and systemic risks. The Basel Committee has concluded that 
the assumption that institutions were too big or too interconnected to fail 
introduced additional risk and a greater likelihood of cross-border conta-
gion.26 
The combination of inadequate capital, the lack of oversight of deriva-
tives, and securitization contributed to the financial crisis. However, the crisis 
in the financial markets had an impact far beyond those markets. Globally, 
$2 trillion US dollars of economic output was lost in the G7 countries. The 
collapse of financial institutions placed people’s homes, pensions, and eco-
nomic security at risk. The injection of public funds into the financial system 
in the EU alone amounted to twenty-five per cent of the European Union’s 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In Canada, there were no bank failures be-
cause of a stronger financial regulatory framework, but there were contagion 
effects of international failures. Canada suffered a loss of 400 thousand jobs.27 
Its $32 billion asset-backed commercial paper market collapsed, there was a 
substantial decrease in trade, and a large increase in business bankruptcy.28 
The Bank of Canada has forecasted that, as a result of the crisis, the cumula-
tive foregone economic output from 2009 to 2012 will be nine per cent of 
                                                                    
25  Michael Barr, Ending “Too Big to Fail”, Testimony  before the Subcommittee on Financial 
Institutions and Consumer Credit, Committee on Financial Services, US House of Rep-
resentatives (14 June 2011), online: Brookings Institution <http://brookings.edu>.  
26  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “The Basel Committee’s Response to the Fi-
nancial Crisis: Report to the G20” (October 2010).  
27  Carney, supra note 7 at 2. 
28  Sarra, “Restructuring", supra note 16 at 321; Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy 
Canada, Insolvency Statistics in Canada—July 2009, online: Industry Canada 
<http://www.ic.gc.ca>.  
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the GDP of Canada.29 The size and scope of losses globally distinguishes the 
2008–2009 global financial crisis from previous financial crises, necessitating 
a globally coordinated response.  
III. RESPONSIVE REGULATION  
The myriad of proposals for reform are the product of negotiation among 
multiple jurisdictions in fora such as the World Bank, the Basel Committee, 
the FSB, and the G20. While the issues are clearly on the public policy 
agenda, the range of remedies may be limited by the narrow scope of people 
at the discussion table. Additionally, while there is broad consensus now that 
financial markets have a strong impact on the real economy, a fact that was 
not widely recognized previously, the solutions are being fashioned by finan-
cial market experts with remarkably little input from those persons in the real 
economy affected by long-term framework decisions. The narrow parameters 
of the discussion may mean that the problems underlying the crash will have 
been tinkered with, but not really addressed. Aside from the normative 
choices that need to be made, there are important considerations regarding 
the nature of the regulatory process itself, and the ability of market partici-
pants and ordinary citizens to have their voices included in the range of in-
terests being considered as financial market regulation moves forward. 
Responsive regulation theorists offer one approach that aspires to widen 
the range of participants in the regulatory debate and to offer a more dy-
namic, dialogic, and collaborative framework for discerning the scope of re-
quired regulation and putting it into practice. Regulation is to be responsive 
and compliance-building, as opposed to moving immediately to sanctions.  
A. BRAITHWAITE’S CONTRIBUTION 
Professor John Braithwaite has been in the forefront of conceptualizing re-
sponsive regulation and considering its application across diverse areas of 
law; his ideas have evolved over the past two decades. Braithwaite observes 
that states have become preoccupied with the regulation part of governance, 
yet non-state regulation has grown even more rapidly, moving into an era of 
                                                                    
29  Carney, supra note 7 at 3. 
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regulatory capitalism in which corporations have also been transformed into 
networks.30 He suggests that the state has become both an object and a sub-
ject of regulation, and that “finance capital holds sway over states”, its influ-
ence exercised through capital movements, but also through lobbying global 
institutions that have more direct control over a specific sphere of state activ-
ity, creating severe accountability problems.31 For Braithwaite, “the social 
responsibility of regulators must be not simply to impose controls, but to 
activate and draw on the conscience and the talents of those they seek to 
regulate”.32 Braithwaite suggests that the logical structure for regulatory capi-
talism would see everyone become a guardian of everyone else, with commu-
nities of dialogue recursively accountable to each other, exposing abuses of 
power to community disapproval. Braithwaite draws on organisational psy-
chology research to suggest that deliberation in groups improves the induc-
tive quality of decision-making, ensuring useful perspectives are not ne-
glected, and cultivates offers to take responsibility for sorting out problems, 
in turn setting up an accountability framework.33  
Braithwaite’s dual pyramidal structure of regulation suggests that stake-
holders need to engage in, and exhaust, a pyramid of support prior to access-
ing the pyramid of sanctions.34 The notion is that at the base of the pyramid, 
there is broader room for engagement, education, information sharing and 
negotiation. The support pyramid allows expansion of the strengths of some 
players to cover others’ weaknesses, with Braithwaite suggesting that profes-
                                                                    
30  John Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism: How it Works, Ideas for Making it Work Better 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008) at 3 [Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism]. 
31  Ibid at 25; John Braithwaite, “Accountability and Governance under the New Regulatory 
State” (1999) 58:1 Australian Journal of Public Administration 90 [Braithwaite, “Ac-
countability”]. 
32  Ibid at 4, 8. Braithwaite suggests that corporate governance shapes the daily lives of most 
citizens more than state governance, using the example of triple bottom line accounting, 
where “green markets” are mediated by the interventions of private and non-
governmental organization regulators.  
33  John Braithwaite, “The Essence of Responsive Regulation” (2011) 44:3 UBC L Rev 475 
[Braithwaite, “Essence”]; John Braithwaite, “The New Regulatory State and the Trans-
formation of Criminology” (2000) 40:2 British Journal of Criminology 222 at 233. 
34  Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism, supra note 30 at 78, 154. 
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sionals such as lawyers and accountants serve as private regulators in lobbying 
efforts in their own right, and that they also serve as a mediating force for 
clients they represent who may have fewer incentives to engage in the sup-
port pyramid. When it becomes necessary to access the pyramid of sanctions, 
attitude to compliance is important.35 Moving from the base of the pyramid 
up to more onerous compliance responses, Braithwaite advocates counsel-
ling, notice, voluntary undertakings, enforcement, and at the extreme, loss of 
license or other approval to operate. Braithwaite suggests that regulated enti-
ties, regulators, and other interested parties move up and down several pyra-
mids of decision, incentives, and action at any given point or on particular 
issues.  
Braithwaite emphasizes the importance of regulation to be responsive to 
individual context and the environment in which business operates, and 
regulators need to be responsive to the moves that regulated businesses 
make.36 He advocates nine broad principles for regulatory engagement. First, 
think in context, without imposing preconceived theories; regulation may be 
privatization of functions or socialization. Second, the regulator should lis-
ten actively, structuring the dialogue to give voice to multiple stakeholders. 
He suggests that persons and parties regulated, rather than the regulator, 
should make argument for change. The regulator’s role is to raise regulatory 
concerns, understand resistance and adapt standards, Braithwaite observing 
that where regulation undermines confidence of market players, it reduces 
the motivation to fix problems. The third principle is to engage those who 
resist with fairness, showing respect by construing their resistance as an op-
portunity to improve regulatory design.37 Fourth, he advocates praise for 
those who show improvement, which supports innovation and nurtures mo-
                                                                    
35  Ibid. Actors are characterized, from the base of the pyramid, as “leading citizens” engaged 
in capacity development, rationale actors making determination base on economic utility, 
and incompetent or irrational actors; they range from fully compliant, up through the 
pyramid to able but not willing and then seriously disengaged. 
36  Braithwaite, “Essence”, supra note 33 at 510, in which Braithwaite suggests that if the top 
of the pyramid is not accessible, “lopped off ” as he calls it, the paradox is that the lower 
levels leave the “top” as the more combative stages and thus may be less effective.  
37  Ibid at 20, relying on Valerie Braithwaite, “Games of Engagement: Postures within the 
Regulatory Community” (1995) 17:3 Law & Pol’y 225. 
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tivation to continuously improve.38 Fifth, the regulator should signal that it 
prefers to achieve outcomes by support and education. Braithwaite suggests 
that the regulator should signal, but not threaten, a range of sanctions to 
which it can escalate; signalling that the ultimate sanctions are formidable 
and used where necessary, but only as a last resort.39 Regulators should en-
gage a wider network of partners, such as securities regulators networking 
with one another to place pressure on the firm.40 Eighth, regulators should 
elicit active responsibility for making outcomes better in the future, holding 
actors responsible for past actions where active responsibility fails.41 The 
ninth principle is evaluating how well and at what cost outcomes are 
achieved, communicating lessons learned. Where monitoring reveals signifi-
cant improvement, no one invests in what Christine Parker refers to as the 
“second loop of learning” by spreading news of this outcome across an or-
ganization.42 
Braithwaite suggests that regulators should not rush to law enforcement 
solutions before considering a range of approaches to support capacity build-
ing.43 He suggests the most common reason in business regulation for failure 
of restorative justice and deterrence is that non-compliance is not about a 
lack of goodwill or rational calculation to cheat, but rather, management’s 
lack of competence to comply. Hence dialogue before sanction, with 
Braithwaite believing that the fundamental resource of responsive regulation 
is the belief of citizens in the inexorability of escalation if problems are not 
fixed.44 Punishment can simultaneously increase deterrence and defiance and 
                                                                    
38  Braithwaite, “Essence”, supra note 33 at 21. 
39  Ibid at 2. 
40  Ibid at 26. See also Peter Drahos, “Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical Markets: A 
Nodal Governance Approach” (2004) 77:2 Temp L Rev 401. 
41  Braithwaite, “Essence”, supra note 33 at 28, citing Mark Bovens, The Quest for Responsibil-
ity: Accountability and Citizenship in Complex Organizations (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998). 
42  Christine Parker, The Open Corporation: Effective Self-Regulation and Democracy (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
43  Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism, supra note 30 at 5. 
44  Ibid at 12. 
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thus one must deploy a range of regulatory tools.45 Responsive regulation 
creates a presumption that less interventionist remedies at the base of the 
pyramids are normally the best place to start.46 Responsive regulation, in his 
view, discovers low-cost ways to achieve regulatory outcomes and continuous 
improvement in achieving better outcomes.47  
Overall, Braithwaite’s ideas reflect the need to be contextual and dy-
namic, involve active engagement, structure the dialogue such that it gives 
voice to the regulatee, construe resistance as an opportunity to improve regu-
latory design, signal that the ultimate sanctions are formidable but used only 
where necessary, and engage in evaluative processes. The enforcement offered 
by the pyramid of sanctions provides the regulatory “big stick” operating in 
the background to bring parties to the regulatory design table and keep them 
there.  
B. BLACK AND BALDWIN’S “REALLY RESPONSIVE” REGULATION 
Another approach to responsive regulation is advocated by Julia Black and 
Robert Baldwin, who have developed an analysis of risk-based regulation in 
financial services regulatory oversight. They suggest that regulators should 
regulate in a way that is responsive to five elements: regulated firms’ behav-
iour, attitude, and culture; regulation’s institutional environments; interac-
tions of regulatory controls; regulatory performance; and change. They ob-
serve that ideally, risk-based regulation offers an evidence-based means of 
targeting the use of resources and prioritizing attention to the highest risks, 
in accordance with a transparent, systematic, and defensible framework.48  
Black and Baldwin suggest that risk-based frameworks require regulators 
to begin by identifying the risks they are seeking to manage, as they need to 
select which rules to enforce given their limited resources.49 Risk-based 
                                                                    
45  Ibid at 24. See also Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the 
Deregulation Debate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) at 19–53. 
46  Ibid at 14. 
47  Ibid at 22. 
48  Black & Baldwin, supra note 24. 
49  Ibid at 184. 
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frameworks involve an assessment of the hazard and likelihood of it occur-
ring, under both the inherent risks arising from the nature of the business 
activities and management and control risks, including the compliance re-
cord.50 Black and Baldwin argue that in some scenarios, there will be high 
numbers of incidents from which data on their probabilities of occurrence in 
different situations can be assessed, but in other circumstances, the regulators 
will be dealing with low-frequency events from which reliable probabilistic 
calculations cannot easily be drawn.51 They note that while regulators assign 
scores to activities, any broad categories or even a more granular rating can 
often operate as shorthand for more complex underlying judgments, and may 
conceal hesitancies and qualifications in the confident exposition of the 
number itself.52 Black and Baldwin suggest that where regulators are regulat-
ing situations of “uncertainty” rather than “risk”, then, by definition, there is 
no comparable set of data available on past incidences from which probabili-
ties can be derived or against which regulatory strategies can be correlated.53 
Black and Baldwin observe that command- and sanction-based instru-
ments operate on very different understandings than do educative or eco-
nomic incentive systems of control, suggesting that there can be dissonance 
between these tools, where imposing sanctions on a deterrent basis may un-
dermine a concurrent strategy to “educate and persuade”. Thus, the really 
responsive regulator must manage tool and strategy interactions.54 Black and 
Baldwin argue that risk scoring should take account of attitudinal matters, 
that attitudes and their impacts on the risk framework may vary across regu-
latory tasks, and that astute regulators will be clear about the degree to which 
any particular regulatory task can be guided by a risk-scoring system.55 They 
also argue that regulatory design and operations should reflect the way regu-
                                                                    
50  Ibid. 
51  Ibid. The Ontario Securities Commission operates on the same premise regarding prob-
abilities and magnitude . 
52  Ibid. 
53  Ibid at 201. 
54  Ibid at 186, citing Neil Gunningham, Peter Grabosky & Darren Sinclair, Smart Regula-
tion: Designing Environmental Policy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998). 
55  Black & Baldwin, supra note 24 at 193. 
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latory challenges vary across the core tasks regulators have to carry out, in-
cluding detecting noncompliant behaviour, responding to that behaviour by 
developing tools and strategies, enforcing those tools on the ground, assessing 
their success or failure, and modifying them accordingly.56  
Also difficult is that risk-based regulation involves delegation of many 
regulatory functions to the firms being regulated, focusing attention on the 
quality of a firm’s internal controls and the notion of “meta-regulation”.57 
Black and Baldwin argue that delivery on firm undertakings is extremely dif-
ficult, because there is often considerable dissonance between the regulators’ 
and the firms’ understanding of risk priorities. There is also dissonance on 
the issue of whether to err on the side of over-intervention (assuming that 
certain firms pose risks when they do not) or of under-intervention (assum-
ing that firms do not pose risks when they do), and whether regulators may 
pay too little attention to the potentially huge cumulative effect of particular 
types of compliance failures across firms.58  
C. APPLICATION TO STRUCTURED FINANCIAL PRODUCTS 
MARKETS  
Braithwaite’s urging to think in context and listen actively is an important 
observation about regulatory design. However, assumptions about relation-
ship of market participants may limit the framework’s application to finan-
cial products markets. The context of structured financial markets is one of a 
rapidly moving, largely unregulated market, where powerful economic inter-
ests make decisions that have a significant financial and economic impact. 
                                                                    
56  Ibid at 187. Black & Baldwin argue that the UK government’s “light touch” regulatory 
philosophy shaped regulatory interactions and understandings about the appropriateness 
of regulatory demands, the degree to which domestic regulators placed faith in controls 
by other national regulators to control globally interconnected markets, and the extent to 
which domestic regulators considered themselves constrained by regulatory competition 
within the international institutional environment. 
57  Ibid at 199, citing John Braithwaite, “Meta-Risk Management and Responsive Regulation 
for Tax System Integrity” (2003) 25:1 Law & Pol’y 1. See also John Braithwaite & Peter 
Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 
2000); Parker, supra note 42. 
58  Black & Baldwin, supra note 24 at 203. 
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There are enormous challenges to structuring the dialogue such that it gives 
voice to multiple stakeholders. Braithwaite’s model is built on the relational 
aspects of business relationships, in that stakeholders have repeat interac-
tions. Relationship and reputation bring and keep regulated entities and 
other players at the engagement table.  
1. THE PROBLEM OF EXIT 
The nature of structured financial products and the parties developing and 
selling them is not easily conducive to incentivizing compliance. First, there 
is the “safe haven” problem—the problem of easy exit for parties, beyond the 
reach of national regulators. The very nature of derivatives and securitization 
strategies is such that economic risk is reduced or shed completely by numer-
ous significant market players.  
Braithwaite’s pyramid of sanctions may work for parties who have sunk 
costs or illiquid assets, but the nature of structured financial products allows 
originators to convert to liquid assets immediately. Securitization of debt 
through CDO and other derivatives creates incentives for the originating 
lender not to be duly diligent in its lending decisions, as it can offload the 
risk to the purchasers of various tranches of the debt.59 There are few incen-
tives for the originating lender to exact protective covenants or undertake 
monitoring on an ongoing basis, given that the risk of default is borne by 
other parties.60 Over multiple similar transactions, these disincentives can 
cause a market crisis. The financial institution or product seller has little or 
no remaining “skin in the game”. That risk is bundled and sold in multiple 
tranches, pegged at particular levels of risk and price, but the originator of 
the credit decision is frequently long gone. The originating lenders skim off 
the fees, but other actors in the system are dependent on the liquidity of the 
products themselves; once confidence is shaken, the assets become illiquid, 
and are hard to value or realize. 
While Braithwaite suggests that the regulated parties should make the ar-
gument for change, he is optimistic about the willingness of market partici-
                                                                    
59  Subprime mortgage lending in the US and the consequent crisis is an example of this 
agency problem. 
60  Sarra, supra note 8 at 7. 
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pants to agree to specific goals and mechanisms regarding regulatory over-
sight, and then to comply. This suggestion fails to recognize the safe haven 
problem, where market participants can easily move to jurisdictions with 
considerably less regulatory oversight. It also does not address the incentive 
effects created by the uncoupling of legal and economic interest through de-
rivative products. One driver for participation is parties’ interest in preserv-
ing their own economic advantage, yet for market participants that are fully 
hedged, there is no economic risk remaining and thus little or no incentive to 
engage in participatory processes regarding regulatory design. Black and 
Baldwin’s analysis would suggest that regulators need to be clear about their 
regulatory objectives, taking account of firm behaviour and culture, and then 
be dynamic and responsive in the dialogue of how best to achieve those goals. 
Given the problem of easy exit, the normative choices about the scope of 
regulatory oversight should be made by a broader spectrum of stakeholders 
than those parties that would be directly regulated, as their commitment to 
the process is suspect. 
IV. REGULATORY STRATEGIES MUST ADDRESS IDENTIFIED 
PROBLEMS 
The interplay of structured financial products and real economic activity, the 
regulatory gaps, and the failure to grasp the complexity of specific product 
risk and systemic risk have all become apparent to regulators and market par-
ticipants. The challenge now is to discern a regulatory structure that ad-
dresses the most pressing issues raised by the financial failures, but that cre-
ates a regulatory and market framework that allows continual adaptation to 
market exigencies and allows any oversight to be responsive to new issues as 
they arise. Responsive regulation suggests that regulatory design must first 
identify what is acceptable and unacceptable behaviour, and then respond to 
it by developing tools and strategies that can then be enforced, assessed, and 
modified accordingly.61 Arguably, it must also be sensitive to the behavioural 
incentives and norms that drove the pre-crisis structured financial products 
market. 
                                                                    
61  Robert Baldwin & Julia Black, “Really Responsive Regulation” (2008) 71:1 Mod L Rev 
59. See also Julia Black, Rules and Regulators (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). 
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A. MORAL HAZARD—AGENCY ISSUES AND NEGATIVE 
EXTERNALITIES 
Notwithstanding the recent financial shocks and a dip in the credit default 
swap (CDS) market in 2008, the CDS market is thriving, operating largely 
on a “business as usual” basis. The Bank for International Settlements reports 
that the total notional amount of OTC derivatives contracts outstanding was 
US$614.7 trillion as of December 2009; the gross market value, the cost of 
replacing all existing contracts, was US$22 trillion. CDS continue to be 
written on a broad range of assets and entities; for example, there are now 
CDS being issued on the failure of Greek bonds and other sovereign debt. 
Morgan Stanley recently reported that the US is returning to a period of 
“covenant light” transactions in 2010. The resilience of the speculative 
market, in the wake of other sectors of the economy having not yet 
recovered, speaks to the complexity of the regulatory reform project and the 
ability of sophisticated market players to influence the reform agenda. 
The classic financial paradigm is that stakeholders with an economic in-
terest in financial products have the greatest interest in monitoring the integ-
rity of the system. However, the existence of credit derivatives has compli-
cated this premise by affecting motivations of various stakeholders. Risk is 
exacerbated by the principal-agency problems generated by the disconnec-
tion between legal interest and economic interest arising from credit deriva-
tives. Traditionally, a creditor’s interest in a debtor company was to receive 
return of its capital plus interest and fees, often premised on encouraging an 
ongoing credit relationship with the business enterprise. The introduction of 
CDS in many instances created a misalignment between the creditor’s and 
debtor company’s interests. A creditor can lend an amount to a debtor com-
pany and then purchase CDS many times the value of the underlying refer-
ence asset or entity.62 Thus the creditor has an incentive to have the debtor 
company fail, triggering a credit event in which the value to the creditor from 
settlement of the CDS is greater than repayment of the loan. Some of the 
previous willingness by lenders to not enforce covenants for a limited period 
in order to allow a debtor time to recover from any default or devise a busi-
                                                                    
62  Sarra, supra note 8 at 7. 
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ness plan may be less likely now that the lender is not only fully hedged, but 
over-hedged. 
The changes to the structured financial products market also created 
negative externalities. Historically, there were positive externalities associated 
with commercial bank lending.63 Banks assisted in correcting governance 
problems of firms, facilitated by their superior access to information under 
loan covenants, and through direct intervention with corporate officers or by 
exiting the relationship.64 The bank’s screening and monitoring activities 
benefited numerous stakeholders with an interest in the firm; the decision to 
lend signalled to potential and existing stakeholders the quality of the bor-
rower; the imposition of fixed obligations under the loan agreement helped 
to prevent managerial slack; security rights constrained the ability of manag-
ers to liquidate non-cash assets or unilaterally sell more debt; and loan cove-
nants prohibited specific types of behaviour.  
With derivatives, the disconnection between economic interest and re-
sidual control rights creates a moral hazard, in that originating lenders are less 
willing to expend the time and resources to undertake due diligence in credit 
arrangements, since the risk was passed on through derivatives.65 The origi-
nate-and-distribute model of lending resulted in the lowering of underwrit-
ing standards. Hence the signalling to the market that occurred with the de-
cision to lend was no longer reliable as a measure of the debtor firm’s value. 
Second, as a result of the purchase and sale of credit derivatives, parties have 
frequently given up the negotiation of terms and conditions, including moni-
toring, restrictive covenants, and default control rights in loan agreements, 
because they knew that they would offset their own risk through other struc-
tured financial products. Hence, that prior positive externality was lost as 
senior creditors no longer undertook monitoring and strategic intervention. 
When firms begin to slide into financial distress, corporate stakeholders no 
longer share a common goal of maximizing firm value and constraining 
                                                                    
63  Externalities occur when an economic activity causes an external benefit or cost to third-
party stakeholders that were not directly involved in the transaction. 
64  George G Triantis & Ronald J Daniels, “The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Gov-
ernance” (1995) 83:4 Cal L Rev 1073.  
65  Sarra, supra note 8 at 9. 
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managerial slack, because the originating lender has hedged its risk through 
its derivatives, and multiple subsequent counterparties have done the same. 
Stakeholders that could previously rely on the governance role of banks can 
no longer do so, yet given the diverse nature of their interests, information 
asymmetries, and collective action problems, they are unlikely to be able to 
fill this governance gap.66 Multiplied many times through complex derivative 
transactions, the new negative externalities created more systemic risks across 
the market.  
Another moral hazard can be the “lender of last resort” legislation that 
provides funds when banks fail. While there were clearly social benefits in 
preventing the collapse of the banking system, such legislation creates the 
moral hazard that banks will undertake riskier activities if they know that 
their shareholders will benefit from any upside value generated and taxpayers 
will bear consequences of downside risk. Existing methodologies used by 
banks did not adequately capture the risks of securitized products, and ab-
sent appropriate incentives to develop new methods, the agency issues per-
sist. 
Notwithstanding the considerable moral hazards identified, the notion of 
human responsibility or accountability has been remarkably absent in the 
current public policy debate, save the rare instances where an individual’s 
fraud was made evident by the freezing of markets. Entire markets were af-
fected, yet the discourse has largely been one of “everyone erred and thus no 
one is responsible”, implying that the better strategy is to develop systems to 
mitigate risk going forward, rather than trying to understand which aspects 
of human agency contributed significantly to the crisis. In many cases, there 
have been express releases from personal and professional liability as part of 
the package to remedy the worst effects.67 
Regulatory reform of oversight must acknowledge diverse interests, with 
different economic incentives both within firms and between market players. 
The moral hazard issues engage what Canadian securities regulators have 
called risk-based oversight, where the degree of monitoring and enforcement 
relates to assessment of the seriousness of potential violations and the prob-
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ability of occurrence.68 The degree to which these issues are the subject of 
effective regulatory action also depends on the values and culture of particu-
lar jurisdictions and norms regarding compliance, which may not easily 
translate across borders when considering regulatory oversight of products 
that are international in nature. Absent a regulatory strategy that recognizes 
the economic incentives, a combination of dialogic and compliance strategies 
will not be particularly effective. The challenge is made more complex by the 
constant shifting of stakeholders, resulting in less relational reputation for 
participants to protect. The educative and relational aspects of the responsive 
regulation framework do not really offer answers to these challenges. 
The moral hazards can be addressed in part by ensuring that the regula-
tory framework going forward imposes the costs of any future failures on 
financial institutions or intermediaries themselves. Staged intervention, such 
as occurs with the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions 
(OSFI) in Canada, would help ensure that financial institutions are address-
ing their agency issues, as they are warned to take steps to remedy liquidity 
and solvency issues long before they become a crisis.69 The framework must 
involve a comprehensive assessment of the risks arising from the nature of the 
structured financial products, management and control risks, and the likeli-
hood of the conduct occurring. Such staged regulatory invention can make 
use of the stages of the Braithwaite pyramid, but the timeliness with which 
the intervention takes place must take account of the prudential nature of 
financial services, the complex nature of their structured financial products, 
and the serious consequences of not moving to intervention in a timely man-
ner. A serious question exists about the relationship between the timeframes 
needed for a full exploration of the responsive regulation model, and the 
need for timely, effective intervention. 
                                                                    
68  For a discussion, see Mary G Condon, Anita I Anand & Janis P Sarra, Securities Law in 
Canada: Cases and Commentary, 2nd ed (Toronto: Edmond Montgomery, 2010). 
69  For a discussion of the OSFI intervention program, see Janis Sarra & Gordon Dunning, 
“Assuring the Future: Reform of the Insolvency Framework for Insurance Companies and 
other Financial Institutions under the Canadian Winding-up and Restructuring Act” in 
Janis P Sarra, ed, Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2010 (Toronto: Carswell, 2011). 
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B. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE LINK TO NORMATIVE 
PRESCRIPTIONS FOR OVERSIGHT OF FINANCIAL PRODUCTS 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision suggests that bank corporate 
governance involves the manner in which the business and affairs of banks 
are governed by their boards of directors and senior management, which af-
fects how they: “set corporate objectives; operate the bank’s business on a 
day-to-day basis; meet the obligation of accountability to their shareholders 
and take into account the interests of other recognised stakeholders [includ-
ing supervisors, governments, and depositors]; align corporate activities and 
behaviour with the expectation that banks will operate in a safe and sound 
manner, and in compliance with applicable laws and regulations; and protect 
the interests of depositors.”70 
Governance failures can directly impact regulatory reform in respect of 
financial products markets. The reports generated in the first two years of the 
financial crisis did not mention the corporate governance of banks. It was 
not until the Larosière Report of the EU High-Level Group on Financial 
Supervision concluded that banks’ corporate governance was one of the most 
important failures in the crisis that some attention has been directed towards 
those persons with oversight of the financial institutions that engaged in pro-
liferation of the products.71 The Larosière Report found that boards of direc-
tors failed to understand the nature or scale of the risks of structured finan-
cial products; there was a lack of effective control mechanisms that contrib-
uted significantly to excessive risk taking, and the polycentric nature of fi-
nancial regulation created a gap in oversight of bank corporate governance.72  
                                                                    
70  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “Enhancing Corporate Governance for Bank-
ing Organisations” (February 2006), online: Bank for International Settlements 
<http://www.bis.org> at 4 [footnote omitted] [Basel Committee, “Enhancing”]. 
71  Jacques de Larosière, “The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU” (25 
February 2009), online: European Commission <http://ec.europa.eu>.  
72  Ibid. See also David Walker, “A review of corporate governance in UK banks and other 
financial industry entities: Final recommendations” (26 November 2009), online: 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk>. The independent review of corporate gov-
ernance in the UK banking industry by the UK Government found that there were seri-
ous deficiencies in governance, prudential oversight and financial regulation in the period 
before the crisis. See also Nestor Advisors, “Banks Boards and the Financial Crisis” (22 
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Corporate governance of banks and other financial institutions differs 
from the governance of corporations in manufacturing or other direct eco-
nomic markets because of the prudential nature of bank regulation, the dif-
ferent nature of stakeholders with investments at risk, and the existence of 
deposit insurance. 73 The safety and soundness of the financial system are im-
portant public policy goals. Banks’ liquidity-producing function is based on 
maturity mismatches, but depends on continued access to liquidity from 
deposits, turnover of commercial paper, and inter-bank lending.74 Banks’ core 
business is to accept a mismatch in the term structure of its assets and its li-
abilities.75 Peter Mülbert has observed that banks are compensated for ac-
cepting a maturity mismatch by a premium charged to creditors—a bank’s 
creditors have to pay a higher interest rate than the bank pays for its refinanc-
ing; hence, a bank’s profit increases directly in proportion with the volume of 
lending to creditors.76 Banks depend on continuous access to liquidity in the 
                                                                                                                                               
May 2009); Renee Adams, “Governance and the Financial Crisis” (4 May 2009) [unpub-
lished, archived at European Corporate Governance Institute, Finance working paper No 
248/2009], online: Social Science Research Network <http://papers.ssrn.com>; Finan-
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form of deposits, short-term funding on the inter-bank market, and funding 
on secured financing markets.77 However, the transformation of maturity 
mismatches poses some risks, mitigated both by deposit insurance and by 
central banks as lenders of last resort who provide funds to illiquid banks 
that have a liquidity problem but are not insolvent. In order to better protect 
depositors and policyholders, regulation should ensure greater prudential 
behaviour pertaining to banks’ liquidity risk and its management.78 These 
prudential norms are important because leverage in banks has different im-
plications than for corporations.  
Complexity of structured financial products created opaque balance 
sheets and the inability to appropriate assess and price risks associated with 
derivative products; as a result, directors were unable to monitor risk ade-
quately. There were implications for investors, but also for directors in deci-
sion-making and in creating compensation incentives. Directors and officers 
are often not in control of the bank’s risk profile because derivatives held by 
banks can be very sensitive to exogenous factors that increase risks without 
decisions to do so by directors. Banks are heavily dependent on confidence of 
depositors and creditors, and if a tipping point is reached, they will be sub-
ject to runs on the bank. Leverage, complexity, and sensitivity to exogenous 
risk factors exacerbate vulnerability.  
Globally, the banking industry has wide variance in capital and govern-
ance structures, which means differing risk appetite and incentives to moni-
tor management. Different governance structures also means different ac-
countability mechanisms and different normative views of the degree to 
which deposit holders and other investors should be protected. The pre-crisis 
rules on adequate internal controls, risk management and audit functions did 
not prevent excessive risk taking by financial institutions. Post-crisis stan-
dards should be developed to encourage appropriate risk taking and a culture 
                                                                                                                                               
risk premium as compensation for the higher risk of insolvency), and from minimum 
capital requirements provided for by prudential regulation. 
77  Ibid. 
78  Ibid at 10; Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “Principles for Sound Liquidity 
Risk Management and Supervision” ( June 2008), online: Bank for International Settle-
ments <http://www.bis.org> [Basel, “Principles”]. 
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of compliance, recognizing that the need to shift risk management strategies 
is a continual process and not one that is static. Detailed rules are insufficient 
to remedy the problems that arose in the past two years, and responsive regu-
lation may offer an approach that engages a wider audience to debate the full 
range of compliance incentives and sanctions that may be required. 
Under the guiding norm of bank regulation, prudential regulation and 
obligation, the goals and functions of financial institution corporate govern-
ance are to act in best interests of beneficiaries: depositors, life insurance pol-
icy holders, deposit insurance funds, creditors, and investors. A prudential 
approach should place limits on leverage and require reasonable liquidity, 
which means that the current uses of derivatives need to be adjusted by cor-
porate boards to protect depositors, maintain confidence in the financial 
system, and deal with the agency problems. There should also be authority in 
regulators to remove the directors and senior management of a failing finan-
cial institution and to hold decision makers to account where they have 
failed to act prudentially. Regulators must have sufficient expertise and re-
sources to govern resolution of distressed banks. 
Bank corporate governance should take account of both stakeholders and 
the stability of the financial system, due to the systemic nature of bank activi-
ties. Governance must be responsive to conflicting interests of stakeholders, 
either by direct representation of broad interests on the corporate board or 
through regulatory imperative. Incentives must change and financial reward 
must be separated from excessive risk. Financial institutions must be able to 
demonstrate to the regulator that they have sufficient knowledge and control 
of their risk profile. Directors and officers should understand the bank’s use 
of complex financial products and structures.79 Globally, the majority of 
bank boards are comprised of inside directors or cross-sector appointments, 
not independent directors. Arguably, there need to be incentives to ensure 
that directors acquire financial skills and the capacity for an independent 
second look at decisions regarding structured financial products, creating an 
appropriate balance of independence and skills of directors, and enhanced 
board diversity. There is also a need to reduce conflicts of interest within the 
                                                                    
79  Basel Committee, “Enhancing”, supra note 70. 
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complex structure of global financial institutions and interactions, such as 
professionals advising on investments while managing investment funds.  
The Basel principles for governance include: directors that are qualified, 
with specialized skills; strategic oversight objectives and values; setting and 
enforcing clear lines of responsibility throughout organizations; sound inter-
nal audit controls; and understanding banks’ operational structure and com-
plexity of structure or products. However, principles do not equal change. 
There must be appropriate incentives for directors and officers to pursue 
banks’ best interests. Questions that could be answered by a responsive regu-
latory process include: should there be minimum length of board meetings 
and limits on number of directorships conditioning the availability of a due 
diligence defence on time spent on director duties? Directors must be willing 
and able to ensure the risk management framework and risk appetites of the 
financial institution are appropriate. Should there be financial literacy quali-
fications? Director elections by non-shareholders? Board and director per-
formance appraisal should be linked to risk management and assessment as 
well as profitability.  
One policy question is whether directors and officers should have a direct 
fiduciary obligation to deposit holders—a duty to act in their best interests, 
with a duty of care to beneficiaries. Such a standard would make decisions in 
respect of structured financial products subject to a higher degree of due 
diligence. The requirement to take account of interests would be one mecha-
nism to encourage the adoption of less risky strategies and increase the qual-
ity of banks’ long-term risk management strategy. However, this raises the 
question of why corporate law should intervene over and above the standards 
for acceptable risk-taking established by prudential regulation. One reason is 
to create incentives for management and directors to be more prudent. An-
other is to overcome shortcomings in regulatory resources and ability—but 
this may impair the financial activity necessary for liquidity function; for 
example, the credit crisis that followed the financial crisis.  
Any regulatory change must better understand risk in particular circum-
stances, including identifying risks of structured financial products, under-
standing inappropriate risk concentration, shifting risk stress tests from a 
focus on past events to identifying new risks and potential outcomes and 
adjustments, and ensuring a continuous understanding of a firm’s risk posi-
tion compared with risk appetite. Creating a regulatory framework that rec-
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ognizes these complexities is incredibly challenging. Responsive regulation 
theorists may offer a framework for this approach. Black and Baldwin ob-
serve that risk assessments need to couple their micro level, firm-specific 
analyses of risk with an analysis of risks arising across the financial system as a 
whole, understanding that regulatory processes and outcomes are shaped by 
the institutional environments of both regulatee and regulator.80  
More authority should be accorded to the risk management function 
within financial institutions to counterbalance risk-takers, including direct 
access to the board to allow timely review, evaluation, and action to refine 
strategies. There should be a predictive mechanism for discerning and ad-
dressing the evolving risks of structured financial products, and timely com-
munication to the board rather than letting directors and officers take false 
comfort in regulatory capital ratios.  
As lenders of last resort, central banks’ provision of liquidity during li-
quidity crises or downturns should be closely tied to the efficacy of a firm’s 
internal liquidity risk management decision-making processes. Generally, 
supervisory authorities must be able to assure themselves that banks have risk 
management systems that are conceptually sound and implemented with 
integrity.81 The debate regarding the extent to which there should be regula-
tory intervention to control systemic risk is a rigorous debate between indus-
try participants and regulators, with only a nascent understanding or discus-
sion about the broader public policy implications. 
Finally, much of the above discussion involves the governance of banks. 
An equally complex question is how to engage with the shadow banking sec-
tor, in all its complex business forms, in a meaningful debate about the need 
for, and potential scope of, regulatory oversight. Given the extent to which 
these market participants are implicated in the structured financial products 
market, a regulatory process is somewhat urgently needed. Yet unlike interna-
tional committees of banking supervisors or securities regulators, many of 
these entities want to avoid regulation and have actively politically lobbied 
                                                                    
80  Black & Baldwin, supra note 24 at 194, citing W Richard Scott, Institutions and Organi-
zations. Foundations for Organizational Science, 2d ed (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2001). 
81  Basel, “Principles”, supra note 78 at 7. 
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for such an outcome in the US, UK and other financial centres. Hence there 
are real challenges for advancing the regulatory debate. 
C. RESPONSIBLE REGULATION TAKES TIME AND RESOURCES 
The aspirational goals of Braithwaite’s model are compelling, but the prob-
lems identified above make the realization of a responsive regulatory frame-
work particularly challenging. Moreover, responsible regulation takes sub-
stantial time and resources, which necessarily requires a willingness to reallo-
cate resources to effect such a change. This pessimistic view is not to suggest 
that there is no merit in trying; it merely tries to be realistic about the speed 
with which change is likely to be accomplished, if at all. 
There is an important question regarding the transparency of the crisis 
resolution process and degree of citizen engagement to date. Responsive 
regulation suggests that the regulator should listen actively, structuring the 
dialogue to give voice to multiple stakeholders. Yet there is a need to recon-
ceptualize the notion of “stakeholders” in a dynamic exchange regarding 
remedies and preventive strategies to the harms caused by the financial crisis, 
which may in turn require meaningful support of the capacity building of 
different perspectives to allow truly broad citizen engagement. Direct regula-
tion of financial services markets engages relatively few market players. Yet 
the broad-based and systemic impact of regulatory decisions affects many 
sectors of stakeholders, who are implicated in the markets because of their 
retirement savings, their jobs, and self-directed savings and investment port-
folios. The global financial crisis demonstrated that they are truly stake-
holders in that citizens are affected by outcomes. 
Responsible regulation takes time; one question is what we do in the in-
terim? Arguably, we need to deal with both the ongoing effects of the finan-
cial crisis and the very real effects wearing away at our society, while allowing 
for the possibility of a long-term regulatory process that does engage regula-
tees and broader stakeholder interests in a meaningful dialogic exchange.  
There are costs associated with regulatory reform, and assessments of ef-
fective outcomes must measure the beneficial outcomes against the costs of 
implementation. There may be direct or indirect costs to the financial ser-
vices sector or national and global economies. Truly broad citizen engage-
ment also requires a willingness to dedicate resources to allow organizations 
that could represent consumers of structured financial products, deposit 
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holders, and others affected by regulatory decisions to access relevant infor-
mation, to develop the skills to analyse the regulatory and market challenges, 
and then to participate in the regulatory discussion in a meaningful way. If 
one is serious about a relational approach to regulation, it requires dedicated 
resources to acquire the knowledge, make informed decisions, and offer co-
gent advice, not just from the regulator’s perspective, but from that of inves-
tors of all sizes and sophistication. The assumption that regulators were pro-
tecting market participants is no longer valid, and the challenges for over-
sight going forward may well be better addressed by ensuring that a much 
broader community of interests is engaged in the regulatory reform decision 
process. 
How could broader engagement be accomplished? There is a myriad of 
ways. Community groups and NGOs are very experienced in capacity build-
ing on limited resources and could be tapped for advice or directly engaged 
to assist with a massive capacity-building initiative. Investor groups, financial 
counselling organizations, financial advisors and brokers, community centres, 
unions, and community advocacy groups could be approached to help design 
the process and encourage participation of their members in a dialogic proc-
ess. Policy makers could ensure that there are educational documents that 
contain plain-language analyses of the structural and functional problems 
associated with the crisis and the range of potential options. Once informa-
tion is in a form that is more readily ascertainable and opportunities for de-
bate and discussion are created, individuals in the markets or affected by 
market changes would have some of the basic tools to deliberate options. 
Over time, those tools could be enhanced, as stakeholder engagement in-
creased and the appetite for involvement and capacity for analysing financial 
information grew. 
Even if the small investor/citizen part of the market could be sufficiently 
empowered to become a participant in a responsive regulatory process, there 
is the equally challenging problem of bringing the other players to the discus-
sion table. The issues discussed above illustrate that there are powerful and 
complex interests at play in financial markets: commercial banks, investment 
banks, hedge funds, brokers, derivatives traders, syndicated loan members, 
indenture debt holders, and a host of other participants that have different 
priorities, time horizons, motivations, and risk appetites, and are driven by 
different considerations in terms of engagement in a particular country or 
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community. Braithwaite’s model can accommodate diverse interests, but it 
assumes a financial or other interest by participants such that they will en-
gage in the process. Given the ease of exit, uncoupling of economic interest, 
and intractability of complex but entrenched interests discussed above, there 
is a serious question of how to draw them into the regulatory discussion. 
Aside from the threat of regulation that would seriously curtail their activi-
ties (a hollow threat as long as there are markets to easily migrate to), it is 
difficult to imagine other drivers or incentives. Commercial banks and simi-
larly situated financial institutions may differ in that, at least traditionally, 
they have had an interest in the economic sustainability of the communities 
in which they operate. But, arguably, it is the other market players, those have 
had historically avoided regulatory oversight, that most need to be drawn 
into a regulatory discussion.  
If the preconditions for participation could be addressed, then 
Braithwaite’s nine principles for regulatory engagement might well have 
some application to policy decisions regarding regulatory oversight of finan-
cial products and the markets in which they operate. Given that many indi-
viduals were profoundly affected by the financial crisis, their perceptions of 
the problems and the solutions may differ considerably from regulators or 
sophisticated market participants. While the dollar value of harms they ex-
perienced may be less than larger market participants, the harm relative to 
their personal wealth was substantially greater; and their views on how to 
remedy the harm or protect from future harms are highly relevant. If respon-
sive regulation is to be truly deployed, regulators and other market partici-
pants would have to demonstrate willingness to hear and debate these issues, 
and regulators would have to be prepared to value and respond to the con-
cerns raised. The regulator could try to engage those that resist in regulatory 
change that might better protect small market participants, using truly coun-
terbalancing views to improve regulatory design. Moreover, for the process to 
be truly responsive, regulators would have to be willing to account for regula-
tory choices made, as well as those rejected, including creating public fora to 
communicate those choices back to community participants. It would also 
require a demonstrated willingness to revisit issues where compelling argu-
ments are made questioning regulatory choices, or where outcomes do not 
align with the express objectives of change.  
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Clearly, such a participatory model would be a significant challenge and a 
considerable shift from the narrow consultative processes that occur now. 
However, a start needs to be made somewhere, and first designed processes 
could lead to improvements in the future. They could be facilitated by the 
broad access we currently have through electronic communication platforms. 
In Canada, when there was a restructuring process for the asset-backed com-
mercial paper market, a series of electronic public meetings and conference 
calls were convened by Purdy Crawford, QC, the lead mediator in the proc-
ess, to communicate the issues and choices to the two thousand individual 
investors harmed by the collapse of the market.82 There was significant par-
ticipation by individuals, and a willingness by Crawford and his advisors to 
listen and try to respond to their concerns. 
V. AGREEMENT ON BROAD NORMATIVE PRINCIPLES 
Short-term action could be facilitated by agreeing on several broad norma-
tive principles, which themselves could subsequently form part of a broad-
based public policy discussion. One might critique the idea of starting with 
broad normative principles, when the precise notion underlying responsive 
regulation is to have such choices organically develop through the dialogic 
process. However, starting with the status quo as the baseline norms is to start 
with the very norms that caused the financial crisis and resultant harms. It 
would create unfairness at the outset of the dialogic process, exacerbating the 
already extant problems of information and resource asymmetries and collec-
tive action challenges. To suggest that no normative choices be made at the 
outset, pending capacity building and broader stakeholder debate, is to con-
tinue the current trajectory of the speculative market, exacerbating resource 
imbalance and distributive consequences of current regulatory policies. Any 
starting principles could be viewed as placeholders until new norms are de-
veloped, as well as providing a baseline for the public policy discussion. 
Agreement on starting principles may also reduce potential regulatory cap-
ture as the responsive process moves forward. The longer-term normative 
content could be worked out in the course of engagement between regulators 
and stakeholders. These starting principles could include the following: 
                                                                    
82  Sarra, “Restructuring”, supra note 16. 
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A. PROHIBIT MULTIPLE-VALUE CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS  
The first principle would be that credit default swaps should be a risk man-
agement product and not a speculative product. This norm is drawn directly 
from the discussion above regarding the harms caused by the speculative as-
pects of the market to both smaller retail investors and, more generally, to 
communities from the collapse of economic activity as a result of the finan-
cial crisis. Regulators could prohibit multiple-value credit default swaps, 
making swaps like insurance, which requires an insurable interest. In order to 
be able to insure, a party must be able to suffer a loss than can be accounted 
for; it cannot issue multiple insurance contracts on the same economic inter-
est. By prohibiting the ability to purchase CDS and equity swaps in multiples 
of the value of underlying assets, the incentive to cause failures in order to 
“game” or reap rewards from default would be reduced. This change would 
bring back the important monitoring function of debt, offering incentives to 
investors to assess and monitor credit-worthiness. It would allow going con-
cern restructuring of insolvent businesses to take place as the parties at the 
table would have an increased interest in the longer-term wellbeing of the 
entity.  
B. BRING DERIVATIVES UNDER SUPERVISION AND REGULATORY 
OVERSIGHT 
This norm arises directly in response to a principal cause of the financial cri-
sis, on which there is now broad consensus among governments worldwide: 
specifically, the failure to regulate derivatives activity. Lack of regulatory 
oversight of derivatives meant that regulators were not aware that the build-
up of large counterparty exposures between particular market participants 
was not appropriately risk-managed. There was serious “contagion risk aris-
ing from the web of interconnectedness of market participants created by 
bilateral clearing of OTC derivatives products, and the limited transparency 
of overall counterparty credit risk exposures”.83  
                                                                    
83  FSB, Implementing OTC Derivatives Market Reforms (25 October 2010), online: 
<http://www.financialstabilityboard.org> at 19. 
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There was little or no oversight of structured financial products because 
they were viewed as part of the exempt market in securities, which ignored 
both spread of products to less sophisticated players and the contagion effect 
of cascading swaps. If the first normative principle above is adopted to im-
mediately temper the most egregiously harmful aspects of the derivatives 
market, one could then utilize a responsive regulatory process to determine 
longer-term measures. Those measures might include prohibition of entities 
necessary to financial stability or the economy from engaging in the “casino” 
activities in the speculative market. Or, if not a prohibition, it may instead 
consider potential regulatory oversight of the “gambling” with other people’s 
money. 
Financial institutions and persons that create or recommend derivatives 
products should meet due diligence standards in examining and disclosing 
material adverse risk in the products being sold in the public market. There 
should be meaningful remedies for purchasers in the event of those individu-
als recommending products failing to meet due diligence and disclosure obli-
gations. Financial institutions that recommend derivatives products must 
train employees responsible for distributing risk products to understand and 
communicate the risk involved and understand conflicts of interest. New 
products must be certified as transparent before being sold. Regulatory over-
sight would monitor and, where necessary, implement sanctions against fail-
ure to comply with the due diligence standard. 
Arguably, there should be international standards for core financial mar-
ket infrastructures, including payment systems, securities settlement systems, 
and central counterparties, to ensure resilience under stressed conditions.84 
One can see the initial regulatory policy responses. The G20 has agreed that 
all standardized OTC derivatives contracts should be traded on exchanges or 
electronic trading platforms, where appropriate, and cleared through central 
counterparties; they should also be reported to trade repositories.85 The In-
ternational Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) has issued 
high-level global standards that recognize the need for regulators to be con-
                                                                    
84  FSB, supra note 2 at 8. 
85  G20 leaders have agreed that all standardized derivatives contracts should be cleared 
through central counterparties by the end of 2012: ibid. 
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scious of systemic risk and their role in relation to it, given that the extent of 
regulation or exemption there can serve as a mechanism by which risk is 
transferred within the financial system.86 It advocates regulatory processes to 
monitor, mitigate, and appropriately manage such risks, having particular 
regard to investor protection, market integrity, transparency, and the proper 
conduct of business within markets as contributing factors to reducing sys-
temic risk.87  
The recent introduction of the first central counterparty clearing plat-
forms (CCP) is aimed at increasing transparency for derivatives market par-
ticipants and offering a means of imposing risk controls, such as robust mar-
gin requirements, to hinder the accumulation of large and uncollateralized 
CDS positions.88 The existence of sufficiently capitalized CCPs mean that 
counterparties do not have to rely on their capacity to settle the swap when a 
credit event occurs. The risk is shifted to the CCP, but it has controlled this 
risk through capital adequacy and other requirements for parties to be eligi-
ble to clear on the CCP. The UK financial authorities have observed that 
“greater use of CCP clearing can aid market liquidity and efficiency, be a mo-
                                                                    
86  IOSCO, Media Release, “Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation” ( June 
2010), online: <http://www.iosco.org>. IOSCO’s mission statement has been amended 
to include identifying, addressing, and reducing systemic risks, and strengthening its role 
in the international financial community by developing, implementing, and promoting 
adherence to consistent standards of regulation. 
87  Ibid at principles 19, 20, 22. Entities that offer investors analytical or evaluative services 
should be subject to oversight and regulation appropriate to the impact their activities 
have on the market or the degree to which the regulatory system relies on them. Added to 
IOSCO’s pre-crisis principles for auditors and other information service providers, the 
new principles call for auditors to be subject to adequate levels of oversight and to be in-
dependent of the issuing entity that they audit. Credit rating agencies should also be sub-
ject to adequate levels of oversight, with the regulatory system ensuing that credit rating 
agencies whose ratings are used for regulatory purposes are subject to registration and on-
going supervision. See IOSCO, “Final Update: 35th Annual Conference of the Interna-
tional Organization of Securities Commissions” (10 June 2010), online: <http://www 
.iosco.org>. IOSCO noted that some practices implicated in the financial crisis fell under 
existing IOSCO regulatory principles, even if those principles had not previously been 
applied to a particular category of products. 
88  US Department of the Treasury, Press Release, “Regulatory Reform Over-The-Counter 
(OTC) Derivatives” (13 May 2009), online: <http://www.treasury.gov>. 
2011 RISK MANAGEMENT 817 
 
tivating force behind contract standardisation, and reduce systemic risk.”89 
The Bank of Canada has suggested that properly risk-proof CCP act as fire-
walls against the propagation of default shocks across major market partici-
pants.90 The benefit of clearing through a CCP is that the CCP multilaterally 
nets and therefore reduces counterparty risk, and it provides for mutualiza-
tion of the loss beyond the contributions of the defaulting member via de-
fault and guarantee funds.91 Risk is managed centrally and the prior inter-
connectedness of market participants in bilateral transactions is reduced and 
may be better managed.92 “Increased standardization of contractual terms 
and operational processes should lead to greater liquidity and greater avail-
ability of reliable pricing data for such products, and thus a greater likelihood 
that a CCP can effectively risk manage them”.93 As of 2010, $25 trillion US 
total notional outstanding credit default swaps were being traded on CCP.94 
 CCPs do not, however, address any of the incentives that were driving 
the market at the time of the failure, and, arguably, they continue to support 
the speculative aspects of the market by facilitating the transactions. While 
CCPs do address some important aspects of systemic risk, their entry into 
the market may have short-circuited a broader normative public policy dis-
cussion about the need for a speculative market on top of the risk manage-
ment benefits of the market, as well as discussion about the ability of finan-
cial products markets to seriously undermine real economic activity. 
CCPs do not yet address non-financial derivatives participants, nor are 
they aimed at any normative determination of the risks associated with par-
                                                                    
89  UK, Financial Services Authority & HM Treasury, Reforming OTC Derivative Markets: A 
UK Perspective (December 2009), online: FSA <www.fsa.gov.uk> at 11. 
90  CCPs are now available to financial institutions to allow for purchase and sale of deriva-
tives and fluidity of settlements. The introduction of CCPs will reduce settlement risk for 
financial institutions. The premise is that there are adequate capital adequacy require-
ments in place to hedge against counterparty failure and that access to the CCP is based 
on a measure of experience and sophistication.  
91  FSB, supra note 83 at 35. 
92  Ibid at 35. 
93  Ibid at 4. 
94  Ibid at 24. 
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ticular products or the downstream harms that may occur from particular 
products being in the marketplace.95  
To date there is little regulatory oversight of CCP, approvals largely tak-
ing the form of exemptions from particular market requirements as opposed 
to active oversight to reduce systemic risk. There continues to be a serious 
lack of transparency in respect of the products in the market, their settle-
ment, and any risks posed. To date, regulators have only limited access and 
limited authority to obtain information from CCP, arguably posing new 
kinds of systemic risks. Globally, regulators are working to try to agree on 
data reporting from CCP, but to date there are few requirements and no 
harmonization. The FSB has reported that the difficulties in obtaining useful 
and comparable central clearing data are a serious impediment to under-
standing the overall state of the OTC derivatives markets and setting central 
clearing targets. Because of the challenges presented by currently available 
data, and because the determination of which products can be standardized 
and risk-managed by a CCP requires knowledge of market conditions and 
product risk and liquidity characteristics, market participant cooperation 
will be vital for authorities in determining where increasing standardization 
and central clearing is feasible.96 Here again, the responsive regulation ap-
proach may offer some insights in how to get parties to the regulatory discus-
sion table. 
The FSB has suggested that “authorities should work with market par-
ticipants to increase standardization of OTC derivatives products’ contrac-
tual terms”, and that “in setting priorities for increased standardization of 
contractual terms, authorities should consider the systemic relevance of par-
ticular types of OTC derivatives products, including by assessing factors such 
                                                                    
95  Financial Services Authority & HM Treasury, supra note 89. The UK Treasury and the 
FSA have proposed measures to address systemic shortcomings in OTC derivative mar-
kets, including greater standardization of OTC derivatives contracts to enhance the effi-
ciency of operational processes, facilitating the increased use CCP clearing and trading on 
organised trading platforms, and supporting greater comparability of trade information. 
IOSCO and the Basel committees are discussing revision of existing standards, and the 
European Commission (EC) is considering a Clearing Directive as a tool to mitigate any 
risk. 
96  FSB, supra note 82 at 24. 
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as volumes and exposures”.97 G20 leaders have agreed that non-centrally 
cleared contracts should be subject to higher capital requirements.98 
Mandatory clearing requirements will capture only standardized OTC 
derivatives and non-centrally cleared contracts continue to be subject to bi-
lateral counterparty risk management. Most OTC derivatives continue to be 
risk-managed on a bilateral basis between counterparties, and the FSB ob-
serves that even with implementation of mandatory clearing and capital re-
quirements, a portion of the OTC derivatives markets will remain bilaterally 
risk-managed.99 Counterparty credit risk arising from OTC derivatives trans-
actions could be reduced by due diligence prior to establishing the relation-
ship, setting and monitoring credit line limits, and creating mitigation meas-
ures including bilateral netting, collateralisation, and portfolio reconcilia-
tion.100 
One additional risk-controlling strategy could be that regulators set a 
price for participation in the market, by taxing credit derivatives on a per 
transaction basis—placing a small amount on each transaction in a central 
trust fund in the domestic jurisdiction in which the credit derivative is being 
purchased, with that fund available to counterparties that had been unfairly 
harmed by failure to disclose or other misconduct by market participants. If 
the funds were insufficient to cover harms, the financial services industry 
could be subject to a risk levy, just as occurs in numerous jurisdictions for 
pension deficiency coverage. Such a fund could reduce risk by having com-
pensatory funds available, placing the cost of compensation with the market 
participants causing the harm, and by creating a mechanism through which 
counterparties are required to account for their excessive risk-taking activi-
ties. 
These regulatory initiatives are important and should reduce some coun-
terparty risk and systemic risk. However, the limited scope of participants 
crafting these changes raises a more fundamental policy question that has not 
                                                                    
97  Ibid at 3. 
98  Ibid. The FSB has recommended that authorities should set strengthened bilateral coun-
terparty risk management requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives. 
99  Ibid at 47. 
100  Ibid. 
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been addressed in these regulatory initiatives, which is the social utility of 
derivatives versus their harm. There has been no debate regarding whether 
there should be limits or a ban placed on the speculative market, as opposed 
to products’ risk management function. There has been no discussion on 
whether financial institution access should be restricted, based on their pru-
dential nature. Responsive regulatory methods, if provided with the appro-
priate resources, could be used to engage stakeholders in these more funda-
mental policy questions. 
C. REQUIRE SOME RETENTION OF ECONOMIC INTEREST IN 
SECURITIZATION TRANSACTIONS  
Many governments, banking organizations, and supervisory authorities have 
now acknowledged that uncontrolled securitization can create specific and 
systemic risks to financial and capital markets; hence, a working norm could 
be to require entities and parties that are securitizing debt to retain some 
economic interest in the initial transaction. The Basel Committee has ob-
served that successful management of market and credit risk often relies on 
liquid markets to hedge risks and unwind positions.101 “Securitization trans-
forms credit risk into market risk by pooling loans and issuing tradable claims 
against the pool; it relies on the liquidity of primary markets for placing as-
set-backed securities.”102 
There are considerable problems in associating market and credit risk too 
closely with the intended use or holding period of an investment. The Basel 
Committee has observed that the trading portfolio of banks is often treated 
as being primarily subject to market risk even though unexpected defaults 
may occur—for example, in a traded bond portfolio—suggesting, however, 
that this is a misconception.103 It suggests that “an underestimation of the 
credit risk embodied in structured products resulted in large writedowns by 
                                                                    
101  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “Working Paper No. 16: Findings on the In-
teraction of Market and Credit Risk” (May 2009), online: Bank for International Settle-
ments <http://www.bis.org> at 6 [Basel Committee, “Findings”]. 
102  Ibid at 2. 
103  Ibid at 8. 
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financial institutions during the crisis.”104 Securitization is fundamentally 
different from traditional bank lending because banks, after having origi-
nated the loans, hold them only for a short time before the loans are sold, or 
before the associated risks of the loans are sliced into tranches and then sold. 
Currently, those engaged in securitization can shed the entire amount of debt 
immediately, creating a number of agency issues and negative externalities. 
Requiring lenders to retain a portion of the economic interest would rekin-
dle the positive externalities associated with the governance role of debt. 
When structured appropriately, securitization allows a bank to manage 
credit and other risks of its loan portfolio and allows it to focus on financial 
intermediation activities, such as borrower screening and monitoring.105 Ar-
guably, these are valuable functions. Yet incentive problems at various stages 
of the securitization process can lead to severe mispricing. As the Basel 
Committee has pointed out, “if securitisation markets become illiquid, banks 
can be exposed to heightened risk from exposures to both credit risk (de-
faults), for example as loans can no longer be securitised, and to market risk 
from changes in the mark-to-market value of the securitised assets.”106 The 
Committee also notes that “an important element in aligning the incentives 
between underwriters and investors is that banks retain a sufficiently strong 
economic interest in the securitised assets they sell, retaining some exposure 
to securitisation cash flows whose payoffs are especially sensitive to how well 
the bank performs its origination, monitoring and servicing activities.”107 On 
the buy side, investors in securitization instruments need to have a better 
understanding of the associated risks.  
The complexity of certain securitization structures obscured the links be-
tween the performance of the underlying assets and the price of the instru-
ments. For example, the price of CDO tranches is sensitive to factors such as 
                                                                    
104  Ibid. 
105  Ibid at 19. 
106  Ibid at 20, also finding that “in addition, when risk-sharing markets become illiquid, the 
signals from prices can become distorted or even disappear, rendering risk measurement 
especially challenging.” 
107  Ibid at 20. 
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“forward-looking perceptions of credit default correlations.”108 The Basel 
Committee has observed that for more complex structures such as re-
securitizations and synthetic transactions, this sensitivity is even more severe, 
making such products very difficult to price.109 It observes that valuation and 
risk measurement of structured finance instruments is subject to high levels 
of model uncertainty, which should be explicitly incorporated in the analysis 
of the risk associated with these positions.110 
A requirement that a proportion of the exposure be left on the originat-
ing lender’s balance sheet, or that a seasoning period be required before the 
debt can be sold, could address some of the immediate agency issues associ-
ated with the speculative market. However, “skin in the game” must be set at 
a sufficiently high level that the amount does not merely become the en-
trance price for continuing the same kinds of conduct. A responsive regula-
tory approach could assist in determining what the appropriate level of re-
tained interest should be, to generate a culture of greater attention to sys-
temic risk. Another agency issue that is beyond the scope of this paper are 
“the risks created through the conflicts of interest in activities of credit rating 
agencies and a more fundamental question of whether credit ratings are the 
appropriate vehicle to control risk”.111  
D. LINKING CAPITAL ADEQUACY STANDARDS AND 
REMUNERATION TO RESPONSIBILITY 
Here again, the norm is drawn from results of extensive studies by the FSB, 
Basel Committee, and the G-20, examining capital adequacy and its role in 
the failure of large financial institutions, as well as the role that remuneration 
incentives played in encouraging directors and officers to shirk their 
governance and oversight responsibilities. 
In September 2010, the Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision 
(the oversight body of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision) 
                                                                    
108  Ibid. 
109  Ibid. 
110  Ibid at 21. 
111  Ibid at 21. 
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announced a substantial strengthening of existing capital requirements: 
“Basel III”. The reform will increase the minimum common equity 
requirement from 2% to 4.5%, and banks will be required to hold a capital 
conservation buffer of 2.5% to withstand future periods of stress, bringing 
the total common equity requirements to 7%.112 Banks whose capital falls 
within the buffer zone will face restrictions on paying dividends and 
discretionary bonuses, so the rule sets an effective floor of 7%.113 The buffer 
serves as a means for banks to take corrective action when they experience 
liquidity or solvency risks, allowing the banks to absorb the losses without 
triggering a financial failure. 
A countercyclical capital buffer “will be implemented according to na-
tional circumstances . . . to achieve the broader macroprudential goal of pro-
tecting the banking sector from periods of excess aggregate credit growth.”114 
This buffer “will only be in effect when there is excess credit growth that is 
resulting in a system wide build up of risk.”115 The objective is “to ensure that 
banks maintain a buffer of capital that can be used to absorb losses during 
periods of financial and economic stress”; in turn aimed at sound supervision 
and bank governance. The Basel Committee anticipates the changes will 
address the collective action problems that “prevented some banks from 
curtailing distributions such as discretionary bonuses and high dividends, 
even in the face of deteriorating capital positions”.116  
The new standards are aimed at improving the resilience and long term 
sustainability of banks. They are a risk reduction measure, not only in that 
                                                                    
112  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Press Release, “Group of Governors and 
Heads of Supervision announces higher global minimum capital standards” (12 Septem-
ber 2010), online: <http://www.bis.org> [Basel Committee, “Standards”]; Brooke 
Masters, “Basel rewrites capital rules for banks”, Financial Times (12 September 2010), 
online: <http://www.ft.com>.  
113  Ibid (to be fully implemented in 2019).  
114  Basel Committee, “Standards”, supra note 112. The countercyclical buffer will be “within 
a range of 0%–2.5% of common equity or other fully loss absorbing capital”.  
115  Ibid. 
116  Ibid. “While banks are allowed to draw on the buffer during such periods of stress, the 
closer their regulatory capital ratios approach the minimum requirement, the greater the 
constraints on earnings distributions.” 
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they will ensure more capital for future downturns, but because they are 
aimed in part at shifting the conduct of decision makers. One goal is to 
curtail conduct such as high remuneration and dividends by placing greater 
responsibility on decision makers at the front end of the decision process 
regarding financial management and capital sufficient to weather a crisis. 
Regulators want to prevent the most egregious effects of any future financial 
crisis and smooth out both financial and resultant economic cycles. 
Regulators also want to ensure that the costs of further crises are borne by 
directors, officers, and equity investors. The linkage to structured financial 
products is that decisions may be made more with a view to risk management 
than for speculative gain. 
The new Basel III standards for capital adequacy are modest at best. The 
initially proposed standards were cut by half because of pressure from banks 
in some jurisdictions that they would never be able to comply with the 
standards.117 Arguably, there is still not a sufficient link to responsibility of 
decision makers, such that the incentives have not been sufficiently 
realigned. 
Responsive regulatory processes could be engaged to evaluate changes and 
determine the need to strengthen particular aspects. Effectiveness and 
intensity of supervision needs to be strengthened for entities engaged in 
offering structured financial products, especially systemically important 
institutions. The recent initiatives are only a beginning of what is needed. 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has acknowledged that 
current capital framework for market risk does not capture some key risks 
that arose in the financial crisis.118 As lenders of last resort, central banks’ 
provision of liquidity during liquidity crises or downturns should be closely 
tied to the efficacy of a firm’s internal liquidity risk management decision-
making processes. Generally, supervisory authorities must be able to assure 
themselves that banks have sufficient capitalization and market risk man-
agement systems that are conceptually sound and implemented with integ-
                                                                    
117  See Masters, supra note 111. 
118  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “Revisions to the Basel II market risk 
framework” (February 2011), online: Bank for International Settlements <http:// 
www.bis.org>. 
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rity.119 The debate regarding the extent to which there should be regulatory 
intervention to control systemic risk is a rigorous debate between industry 
participants and regulators, with only a nascent discussion regarding the 
broader public policy implications.  
Arguably, regulators are currently engaging those market participants that 
resist with fairness, as Braithwaite advocates. It seems that states have ac-
commodated banks by backing off of capital adequacy requirements to allow 
banks a lowest common denominator in terms of the levels of capital ade-
quacy that they are prepared to try to move towards. The transition period is 
highly accommodating of financial institutions. In terms of some emerging 
eastern European and other nations, the thresholds are not likely to be met 
and some international lending institutions are already preparing to accom-
modate these expected failures to comply in their international central bank 
lending decisions. Evaluating how well and at what cost any outcomes are 
achieved should be an important aspect of the recent initiatives. 
1. REMUNERATION 
Arguably, remuneration schemes within banks should be changed to link 
remuneration with the long-term health of financial institutions. Remunera-
tion systems should focus on target staff whose activities can have a material 
impact on the risk exposure of the financial institution. The tension between 
short-term returns and long-term sustainability of financial systems has been 
compounded by compensation practices that rewarded high fees for short-
term profit. Thus, there is a need to implement remuneration schemes that 
counteract incentives at all levels for short-term returns to potential detri-
ment of sustainability. Compensation should reduce incentives to take exces-
sive risk. For employees in risk and compliance functions, remuneration 
should be linked to achieving those goals. Board and officer assessments 
should be tied to management of risk in addition to profitability.  
                                                                    
119  Ibid at 9. 
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2. REDUCING MORAL HAZARD  
A number of distressed banks were rescued by the infusion of public 
funds, both common equity and other forms of Tier 1 capital during the fi-
nancial crisis. This bailing out of banks “had the effect of supporting deposi-
tors, but also the investors in regulatory capital instruments”.120 Conse-
quently, Tier 2 capital instruments, comprised primarily of subordinated 
debt,121 did not absorb losses incurred by several banking corporate groups 
that would have failed had the public support not been available. 
One potential strategy to reduce moral hazard is to implement contin-
gent capital features into preferred shares and subordinated debt issued by 
financial institutions. The Basel Committee has recently issued a consulta-
tion document proposing a mechanism to 
enhance the entry criteria of regulatory capital to ensure that all regulatory 
capital instruments issued by banks are capable of absorbing losses in the 
event that a bank is unable to support itself in the private market.122 
It has observed that numerous public sector injections of capital and 
other public support during the crisis had the “indirect consequence of en-
suring that in many instances equity investors and other capital instruments 
issued by banks that have been bailed out did not suffer any losses”.123 Its pro-
posal is to require a system of contingent capital, on the premise that injec-
tion of capital that is needed to avoid the failure of a bank should not protect 
investors from absorbing the loss that they would have incurred had govern-
ments not intervened. Contingent capital is a security that converts to capital 
when a financial institution is in financial distress, essentially “converting 
debt to equity rather than needing to rely on the state to bail the institution 
out”. It could be a required feature of future issue of subordinated securities 
                                                                    
120  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “Consultative Document: Proposal to ensure 
the loss absorbency of regulatory capital at the point of non-viability” (August 2010), 
online: Bank for International Settlements <http://www.bis.org> [Basel, “Proposal”] at 
1. 
121  Ibid, and in some cases non-common Tier 1 instruments. 
122  Ibid. 
123  Ibid at 3. 
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or debt, creating a type of “bail-in” mechanism. The Basel proposal is aimed 
at ensuring that all regulatory capital instruments would be able to absorb 
losses in the event that a bank cannot find liquidity in the private market, 
including situations when the state steps in to recapitalize and rescue a bank. 
The Basel Committee notes that 
gone-concern loss absorbency would continue to work through subordina-
tion in liquidation for failed banks when the authorities allow them to enter 
liquidation. However, if the authorities choose to rescue a bank, then the 
proposal would give the regulatory authorities the option to require regula-
tory capital instruments, other than common shares, to be written off or 
converted into common shares.124  
In other words, the Committee proposes to redefine “gone concern” to 
include the point where a public bail-out would be necessary, instead of just 
insolvency and liquidation, ensuring that equity investors, and in some in-
stances subordinated debt, would absorb the losses before taxpayers would 
have to. Such a mechanism could help address the moral hazard issues by 
incenting managers and shareholders to act more prudently to avoid the 
diminution or loss of their equity holdings. It should reduce excessive risk-
taking. 
E. REQUIRE GREATER TRANSPARENCY OF DISCLOSURE 
There must be transparency, so that risk can be properly assessed and appro-
priately priced, as well as effective remedies, so that those unfairly harmed 
have meaningful recourse. Disclosure is a broadly accepted norm in securities 
markets and there is no reason why the same degree of transparency regard-
ing material information and material risk cannot be also required in respect 
of derivatives and other structured financial products. 
Information asymmetries in the OTC market could be reduced through 
disclosure requirements that are targeted and measured against potential 
outcomes. The underlying principle is that there must be sufficient disclosure 
of material information to allow market participants to make informed 
                                                                    
124  Ibid at 4. 
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choices about credit derivative investment.125 Protection buyers could be re-
quired to disclose, at the time of purchase, any material adverse risk in the 
reference entity that they are aware of. Protection sellers could be required to 
disclose any material adverse risk to their financial health at the time of the 
sale and/or renewal of a derivative contract. Publicly traded companies could 
be required to disclose the effect of credit derivatives on their risk exposure, 
including how their credit risk has affected valuation of derivative liabilities 
and any resulting gain or loss included in earnings statements, and any 
known information on how counterparty credit risk may have affected their 
valuation of, or ability to collect on, derivative assets.126  
Financial institutions and other parties that create new tranches of deriva-
tives should disclose underlying material risks to the derivatives to counter-
parties; and counterparties and retail investors purchasing derivatives should 
have enforceable remedies for the failure of these entities and individuals to 
disclose material adverse risks at the point of sale of the derivatives.127 Credit 
rating and other entities that recommend investment in derivatives should 
meet a due diligence standard in examining and disclosing material adverse 
risk in the derivative products being sold in the public market.  
The protocol mechanisms developed by the financial products industry 
facilitates industry-wide net settlement of CDS referencing an insolvent en-
tity.128 However, these innovations address only one aspect of the settlement 
process. There continues to be a lack of transparency as to who is bearing the 
ultimate costs of the deficiencies in value when all the CDS settlements are 
completed. The dealer firms tend to have less net exposure as they frequently 
buy protection to offset the risk of the protection they have sold. The same 
                                                                    
125  Sarra, supra note 8. 
126  Ibid. Some jurisdictions have recently amended their securities law to require such disclo-
sures by publicly trading companies. Materiality in this respect could be based on a stan-
dard of whether the facts in respect of the adverse risk reasonably would be expected to 
have a significant effect on the protection seller’s valuation or pricing of the derivative.  
127  Ibid at 11. 
128  Ibid at 15. The recent Lehman Brothers Holdings’ auction illustrated that the market can 
price the value of CDS and allow cash settlement for counterparties to CDS trades. More 
than 350 organizations adhered to the 2008 Lehman CDS Protocol, which provided a 
settlement procedure for approximately US$6 billion of net CDS exposures. 
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may not be the case for end purchasers. A transparency requirement would 
be a first step in engaging in a meaningful public policy discussion regarding 
further reform of regulatory oversight. 
F. STRENGTHEN FRAMEWORKS TO DEAL WITH THE FAILURE OF 
CROSS-BORDER FINANCIAL GROUPS OR CONGLOMERATES 
There is no framework for the resolution of cross-border financial groups or 
conglomerates operating in more than one market segment.129 Cross-border 
resolution is complicated by the potential effect of foreign operations, and 
willingness and ability to bear a share of the burden. “Existing legal and regu-
latory arrangements are not generally designed to resolve problems in a fi-
nancial group operating through multiple, separate legal entities.”130 Reform 
of national insolvency bank resolution schemes could address failing systemi-
cally significant financial institutions. There is a need for mechanisms to 
facilitate capital and liability restructuring as well as liquidation. There is a 
tension between international efforts to harmonize regulation in global fi-
nancial markets for global firms with the real effects of bank failure on na-
tional systems. Responses to bank failures need to be timely and effective, 
and in most cases will fall to national regulators and national solutions; thus 
any regulatory innovation must be responsive to these tensions. As Bank of 
England governor Mervyn King has observed, “global banks are global in life, 
but national in death”.131  
The Basel Committee has observed that prudential measures will not 
limit the potential for increased moral hazard without instituting a viable 
resolution process for financial institutions. Contingency planning is impor-
tant for cross-border financial institution financial distress, including cross-
border cooperation and information sharing. It advocates strengthening risk 
                                                                    
129  For example, in both banking and insurance services. 
130  Basel Committee, Cross-Border, supra note 1 at 4.  
131  Cited in Steve Schifferes, “Can banking regulation go global?”, BBC News (18 March 
2009), online: <http://news.bbc.co.uk>. 
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mitigation mechanisms that reduce systemic risk and enhancing resiliency of 
critical financial functions during a crisis.132 
There is need to improve cross-border resolution capacity. Global banks 
have substantial operations across multiple jurisdictions and thousands of 
legal entities. In the absence of a global resolution regime, effective regimes 
are needed not only at the national level, but also strong capacity for such 
regimes to co-ordinate across borders.133 Regulatory authority should include 
powers that facilitate “going concern” capital and liability restructuring as 
well as “gone concern” restructuring and wind-down measures, with 
establishment of a temporary bridge bank to take over and continue 
operating certain essential functions. Statutory powers enabling the 
resolution authority to bail-in senior debt holders would expand the options 
for going concern resolution. Such authority should extend to authority over 
the shadow banking sector, which contributed to the crisis.134 What does 
responsive regulation contribute to these regulatory initiatives? It could draw 
together skills and expertise in banking, insolvency workout and deposit 
holders or life insurance policyholders to create a dialogic process regarding 
systems design that is responsive to the challenges identified. Creation of a 
stronger framework to address cross-border financial group and 
conglomerate failure could mean fewer financial institution failures and thus 
a substantial reduction in harm to individuals in the future. 
                                                                    
131 Basel, “Proposal”, supra note 120. While a discussion of its initiatives is beyond the scope 
of this paper, its recommendation regarding structured financial products is of note. The 
Basel Committee endorses risk mitigation techniques such as enforceable netting agree-
ments, collateralization, greater standardization of derivatives contracts, clearing and set-
tlement through regulated CCP, and transparency reporting through trade repositories. 
Basel III is aimed at providing a "macroprudential overlay" to better deal with systemic 
risk, including reducing systemic risk by reducing procyclicality, i.e., the financial system’s 
tendency to amplify the ups and downs of the real economy, and by taking account of the 
inter-linkages and common exposures among financial institutions.  
133  Mario Draghi, “Next steps on the road to financial stability”, Financial Times (17 
September 2010) 9. 
134  Ibid.  
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1. SPECIAL MEASURES FOR SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS 
The Chair of the Financial Stability Board, Mario Draghi, has suggested that 
the effectiveness and intensity of supervision needs to be strengthened for 
systemically important institutions in particular, given the wider damage 
their failure would cause. A key source of the risk transmission is the network 
of major institutions’ exposures to each other; particularly OTC derivatives 
markets.135 Draghi has observed that systemically important institutions will 
operate with correct incentives only if an effective resolution framework is in 
place; yet many countries lack these powers, the tools and operational 
capacity. 
The FSB has developed a policy framework for reducing the moral haz-
ard of systemically important financial institutions (SIFI), whose failure, be-
cause of their size, complexity and systemic interconnectedness, can cause 
significant disruption to the wider financial system and economic activity.136 
The framework calls for improvements to resolution regimes to ensure that 
any financial institution distress can be resolved without disruptions to the 
financial system and without taxpayer support. SIFIs should be required to 
have additional loss absorption capacity beyond the Basel III standards to 
reflect the greater risks that these institutions pose to the global financial 
system.137 The FSB suggests that depending on national circumstances, this 
greater capacity could be drawn from a menu of viable alternatives and could 
be achieved by a combination of a capital surcharge, a quantitative require-
ment for contingent capital instruments, and a share of debt instruments or 
other liabilities represented by “bail-in” type claims, which are capable of 
bearing loss at the point of non-viability, thus enabling creditor recapitaliza-
tion and recovery while maintaining vital business functions.138  
The FSB advocates that jurisdictions should provide resolution authori-
ties with the capacity to cooperate and to share information across borders. It 
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137  Ibid at 2. 
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recommends that they review and, where appropriate, eliminate those provi-
sions in national laws that hamper fair cross-border resolution, such as de-
positor priority rules that give preferential treatment to domestic depositors 
over those of foreign branches, or that trigger automatic action in the domes-
tic jurisdiction as a result of official intervention.139 The FSB also recom-
mends more intensive supervisory oversight for financial institutions that 
may pose systemic risk and more robust standards for core financial infra-
structure to reduce contagion risks from the failure of individual institu-
tions.140 Resolution authorities should be obliged to seek cooperation with 
foreign resolution authorities and should have the capacity to cooperate.141 
National laws should be amended to reduce barriers to cross-border resolu-
tion and to allow home authorities with oversight of SIFIs to take into ac-
count the effects on host countries.  
The recommendations are aimed at improving the authorities’ ability to 
resolve such institutions in an orderly manner, without exposing taxpayers to 
loss, while maintaining continuity of their vital economic functions. The 
proposal will necessitate changes to resolution regimes and tools at national 
levels, to enable resolution authorities to coordinate in cross-border resolu-
tion.142  
G. RESPONSIVE REGULATION IS MEANINGLESS ABSENT THE 
RESOURCES, EXPERTISE AND WILLINGNESS TO ENFORCE 
STANDARDS THAT ARE ESTABLISHED 
As pointed out in the discussion above, responsive regulation can play a role 
in developing a more effective oversight and regulation process once broad 
normative starting principles are in place. However, implementing an effec-
tive responsive regulation scheme for financial institutions and structured 
financial products requires a significant investment in capacity-building by 
                                                                    
139  Ibid at 4. 
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regulators and the development of stakeholder organizations representative 
of constituencies that are not as well organized in the financial industry. 
A normative principle should be that considerably more resources will be 
dedicated to building expertise and capacity among regulatory authorities, 
specifically to gain skills to appropriately understand and respond effectively 
to new structured financial products and other market developments. The 
regulatory process is highly dynamic and very complex given its multiple fora 
and stakeholders, and the continuing rapid development of products and 
market strategies. Resources are required to answer the most basic questions 
regarding which aspects of the market even need regulation, and then what 
the oversight and enforcement framework should look like, given all of the 
issues raised above. Absent a very serious commitment to that regulatory 
capacity-building, any change will be modest at best, and foreshadow further 
crises at worst. Increased resources would still leave room for the appropriate 
prioritizing of enforcement strategies based on assessments of risk and the 
impact of particular conduct on individual parties and systems. Numerous 
reports of regulatory failure noted the lack of expertise, resources, and conti-
nuity of regulatory and supervisory staff, as well as conflicts of interest, 
which together resulted in a failure to appropriately monitor and, where nec-
essary, intervene. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Financial markets are deeply interconnected. Even in jurisdictions such as 
Canada that weathered the worst of the financial crisis relatively well, there 
was a considerable contagion effect. A framework that addresses some of the 
worst features and incentives of the structured financial products market 
would go some measure toward ensuring that future crises are prevented or 
tempered in their effects. Responsive regulation is particularly a challenge 
where the relational and reputational aspects are more transient. Regulatory 
spaces in the financial and capital markets are highly diverse; state, SROs, 
international stakeholder organizations, international principles and national 
regulation; and the contractual nature of derivatives and influence of power-
ful private interests such as the ISDA and new CCP, pose a complex chal-
lenge for regulatory design that is truly responsive. If responsive regulation is 
to be an effective tool, it needs a set of basic normative principles that serve 
as starting principles, drawn from the problems identified from the myriad of 
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studies of the global financial crisis. The need to establish such norms is im-
mediate and a process to reach them essential to any longer-term responsive 
regulatory process.  
Responsive regulation offers an optimistic vision of citizen engagement in 
regulatory standard setting, which encompasses notions of both participa-
tory collaboration through public interest and industry groups, and imple-
mentation of restorative justice as a mechanism at the broad end of the 
pyramid as the mechanism for transformation. In this respect, it offers a new 
departure from more traditional policy-oriented examination of regulatory 
issues as it provides the forum for engagement and insights from diverse per-
spectives, all of whom are directly and seriously affected by the regulatory 
choices that will need to be made in the months and years to come. 
